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FOREWORD
After having been fueled by the events of the distant and
recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally
may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of
how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to
define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than
it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph
was published.
Events of the intervening years have largely validated the
insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That
said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of
additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of
the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as a
firmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed
to the outbreak of violence.
In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that
provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain
substantially unchanged. Details have been added, and
interpretations modified–attenuated or accentuated–as the
author’s understanding of events has matured. The last chapter of
the original version has been expanded into three chapters.
Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first
portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed
some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have
created the possibility for new options to be examined, the
policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially
rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, Conclusions, contains
revised reflections on the preceding analysis.
Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on
the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit
into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will
continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a means of providing policymakers and the public a
greater understanding of the complex and complicated Balkan
enigma.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute
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KEY JUDGEMENTS
Insights to Assist Decision-Making.
• The past is always present in the Balkans and defines the
future.
– Centuries of history and myths shape daily events in the
Balkans. Policymakers must understand the bases and importance of
these influences and factor them into policy initiatives.
– The massive depredations of World War II, particularly
Croatian Ustasi actions and the concomitant pan-Yugoslav civil
war, contributed significantly to the outbreak of the ongoing
hostilities, and will continue to influence events.
– Recent history, especially the last four years, has
hardened negotiating positions.
• Cultural cleavage within the Balkans and between Balkan and
U.S. leaders is wider than many understand.
– U.S. and Western European vs. Balkan thought processes.
– U.S. and Western European statesmen must be careful not to
mirror image their values and logic onto Balkan leaders.
– Ethnic identity is sine qua non to individuals in the
Balkans: many are willing to die or kill to protect it.
– The importance of religious animosities should not be
underestimated.
– Violence is an accepted agent of change.
– Compromise represents weakness. Many inhabitants of the
region think in "zero sum game" terms; importantly, frequently in
the past defeat has meant death.
• The ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia stems from
multiple causes:
-Ethnic Identity
--Religion
--Language
--Ethnic Group
--History
--Shared Myths
--Culture
-Nationalism

-Economics
-Regional Differences
-Urban vs. Rural
-Form of Central
Government
-Tito's Manipulation
of Ethnic Groups and
Territories
-World War II

• Moreover, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is not a single

war, but a melange of wars:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Interstate Wars of Aggression
Limited War vs. Total War
Civil Wars
Ethnic Conflict
Religious Conflict
Personal Power Struggles
Battles to Retain Fiefdoms
Individual Psychopaths Attracted to War

• Potential solutions to the ongoing wars in the Balkans,
therefore, cannot focus solely on one or two of the many "wars"
underway. Negotiators must weave a solution that addresses
multiple issues as a complete whole.
• But creating a comprehensive solution in such a complex
strategic environment will be difficult. As a consequence,
negotiators may pursue incremental solutions. But this, too, is
fraught with dangers because many individual initiatives may run
at cross purposes. Such potential pitfalls underscore the
importance of possessing a thorough understanding of the
conflict, and crafting a comprehensive solution prior to
embarking on incremental ways to resolve issues.
• Political institutions are weak. This condition complicates
significantly the ability to arrive at a lasting peace in the
former Yugoslavia.
Long-Term Solutions.
• The search for long-term solutions will be protracted and
difficult.
• A lasting peace in the region requires a fundamental break from
the past along the lines mandated of post-World War II Germany
and Japan.
• To achieve long-term stability requires considerable
expenditure of political, economic, and military capital–will the
United States, the European Union, and other European states
spend it?
• Events in the Balkan crisis have demonstrated that U.S.
leadership in Europe is essential to secure U.S. national
interests in the region and Europe.
• Diplomatic actions, alone, are not likely to bring about a
settlement, and military power will be required to establish
conditions suitable to build a lasting peace settlement.
• Should U.S. political leaders decide to commit ground troops in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, they will have to convince the American

public and Congress that it is in U.S. national interests to make
the size of investments required to achieve an acceptable
solution in the Balkans.
• Stable political institutions in the region that protect ethnic
minority rights are needed to ensure stability over the longer
term.
• Policymakers must recognize that a long-term solution may
require decades, perhaps generations.
Short-Term Options.
• U.S. national interests are engaged.
• There are no easy options. Each has drawbacks, risks, and
costs.
• The United States cannot abstain from participation in
resolving the crisis:
– The United States already is heavily involved: e.g.,
Operation SHARP GUARD, Operation DENY FLIGHT, and Operation
DELIBERATE FORCE.
– The United States has committed to providing up to 25,000
troops to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, should
that be required, as well as up to 25,000 troops to support peace
implementation operations in the former Yugoslavia should a
negotiated settlement emerge.
– Avoiding deeper involvement also holds risks: a wider
conflict, expansion into Central Europe, strains within NATO,
tensions in U.S.-Russian relations.
• Containment of the conflicts within the former Yugoslavia has
been successful, to date, but at tremendous costs to the
inhabitants of the region. And, there is no guarantee that wars
can be contained indefinitely.
• Diplomatic and economic efforts have contributed to, but have
been insufficient to achieve a resolution of the crisis. Military
power (whether in the form of the Croatian Army, the Bosnia Army,
NATO air strikes, or a combination thereof) has been decisive in
bringing the parties to the negotiating table.
• Lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia is problematic. Indeed,
it is likely to precipitate an UNPROFOR withdrawal, which the
United States has pledged to assist. Moreover, the United States
and its allies and partners must be willing to protect Bosnian
forces until they can obtain and make effective use of any new
arms, or lifting the embargo will simply be an empty gesture.

• U.S. political leaders will have to convince the American
public and their elected representatives that U.S. interests are
sufficiently involved to make the investments–intellectual,
political, economic, and military–necessary to achieve a lasting
solution to the Balkan conflicts.
• Given the transfer of populations that has already taken place,
territorial partition and mass exchange of residual populations,
however morally reprehensible, may be a realistic option. It is
fraught, nonetheless, with considerable difficulties: perceived
aiding and abetting "ethnic cleansing," setting bad precedents
for future ethnic violence in Europe, and establishing irredenta.
• Participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) operations is
problematic.
– Ethnic Serbs perceive that the United States has chosen
sides–against them; thus, maintaining a neutral stance will be
difficult.
– U.S. peacekeepers are likely to become targets, perhaps
eventually of all three sides.
– U.S. forces, therefore, initially must be configured,
armed, and sized to engage in possible combat operations.
– U.S. forces must be of sufficient size to merit U.S.
leadership of IFOR. In short, the United States must "pay the
piper if it wants to call the tune."
– Forces must be configured to permit easy and rapid
rotation and replacement.
– Reserve Component individuals and units may be required to
fill critical shortages in Active Component forces.
• Should the current peace initiatives fail to bear fruit, the
United States may become embroiled in operations to impose a
peace. Should that eventuality emerge, policymakers must remain
aware that:
– The United States must be prepared to take action against
any offender, not just against ethnic Serbs.
– The United States will not be able to take half measures.
The United States should not, therefore, start down the path
unless willing to complete the journey.
– Once committed to imposing a peace settlement, U.S.
options will be circumscribed; i.e., U.S. national prestige and
interests will have been committed. Pressure will be intense to
"win," perhaps at the expense of limiting violence, or containing
the conflict.

– To preclude "mission creep" and unintended escalation,
policymakers must clearly define, and continually reassess U.S.
strategic objectives, and desired end states to ensure that
ends, ways, and means remain synchronized.
– Objectives, end states, and success criterion should be
event driven, not time driven.
– The introduction of Muslim forces from outside the region
to assist in peace enforcement operations is fraught with
dangers.
– Use of air power appears to offer the safest, most
effective means to impose a peace, especially in the wake of the
apparent success of forcing the Bosnian Serbs to remove their
weapons from the heavy weapons exclusion zone surrounding
Sarajevo. But appearances may belie reality.
– Policymakers also must consider the key question: What if
air power, even on a massive scale, is insufficient to bring
reluctant belligerents to the negotiations table or to force
compliance with an existing agreement? What further steps would
the United States and its allies be willing to take?
Specifically, will the United States consider the introduction of
ground combat forces to impose a peace?
Key Questions to be Resolved Prior to a U.S. Decision to Commit
Additional Forces, Especially Ground Troops.
• Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
• What is the environment of risk we are entering?
• What is needed to achieve our goals?
• What are the potential costs–human and financial–of the
engagement?
• Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American
people and their elected representatives?
• Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of success or
failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?1
• What are the specific political objectives to be achieved in
Bosnia-Hercegovina? What is the desired end state of the
conflict? How do these objectives contribute to U.S. objectives
for the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, as a whole? How will
they affect U.S. relations with European allies and partners?
What are the potential effects on U.S.-Russian relations?
• Will the employment of military power help achieve national
objectives?

• What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to
achieve political objectives? If air power proves to be
insufficient, what are the next logical steps? Is the United
States willing to take them?
• Will allies or partners join, or at least endorse, the U.S.
resort to military force?
• How long and to what extent is the United States willing to
commit forces to the region?
Policy Recommendations for the Ongoing Conflict in the Balkans:
• The first priority for policymakers must remain ensuring that
the war does not spread beyond its current confines. The ongoing
conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a human tragedy. But expansion
of the conflict could be a strategic disaster. The United
States, therefore, must give priority to preventing spill-over
into Macedonia, Kosovo, or beyond the borders of the former
Yugoslavia.
• The second priority is to sustain a viable, cohesive, and
effective North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
• The third priority is to cap the violence, as the United States
is currently attempting to do, and provide a basis for a more
lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia–and, by extension, the
Balkans.
• American values, not simply geo-strategic realities, must be
factored into the decision-making calculus.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This is the Balkans–rationality isn't a reliable
compass.2
–A Western diplomat in Belgrade
PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this monograph is not to argue for or
against U.S. military intervention in the former Yugoslavia or
elsewhere in the Balkans. The main intent is to garner insights
through historical examination that will shed light on the longstanding bases of the ongoing conflicts in the region. Some might
question the relevancy of an historical exploration when the
first European war since 1945 engulfs the former Yugoslavia and
threatens to spill over to other parts of the Balkans. The
purpose of historical study, however, is not simply to understand
the past, but to inform the present and, hopefully, prepare for
the future.
Nor is this report simply an academic exercise. Policymakers
must be cognizant of the background and complexity of issues if
they are to make informed decisions. As George F. Kennan cogently
noted in his scathing criticism of President Woodrow Wilson's
performance at the Paris Peace Conference (1919):
[His was] the colossal conceit of thinking that you
could suddenly make international life over into what
you believed to be your own image, when you dismissed
the past with contempt, rejected the relevance of the
past to the future, and refused to occupy yourself with
the real problems that a study of the past would
suggest.3
Kennan's words could easily apply to those pundits who have
posed simplistic solutions to the ongoing wars in the former
Yugoslavia. Proponents of single-issue solutions, such as
"surgical" air strikes, economic sanctions, lifting the arms
embargo, or enforcement of "no-fly" zones neither comprehend the
complexities of the issues involved nor address the root causes
of conflict. Policymakers and analysts should seek, instead,
comprehensive solutions to the multiple, interwoven sources of
the conflict.
As anyone familiar with problem solving understands, a
comprehensive solution first requires a definition of the
fundamental nature of the problem. This is no less true when
assessing ethnic conflicts, for in Barry Posen's words, "Whether
one's purpose is to predict, prevent, or resolve such [ethnic]
conflicts, one needs to understand their sources."4 Without an
adequate understanding of the problem and its ramifications,

proposed solutions may not address issues adequately to ensure
resolution. Moreover, what on first consideration seems a
relatively straight-forward solution may actually prove
counterproductive when implemented.
The intent of this report is also to get beyond the
emotional headlines of the day and to open the eyes of
policymakers to local perceptions; as everyone should know,
perception is reality in the eyes of the beholder. An
understanding of perceptions will also help policymakers grapple
with the underlying currents which run so deep in the Balkans and
avoid the pitfall of mirror imaging their own ideas, values, and
perceptions onto a radically different culture. Only through an
understanding of these conditions can policymakers make informed
decisions on the best ends, ways, and means to resolve the
situation. As importantly, historical example may offer potential
insights into second or third order consequences that may result
from any decisions.
SCOPE
Concisely unraveling the tangled web of the Balkans is no
easy task. To avoid oversimplifying highly complex issues, the
more critical issues must be discussed in some detail. Issues in
the Balkans intricately intertwine and require a greater level of
explication to comprehend the relationships and potential
consequences.
Limitations of the written word require that issues be
addressed in a relatively linear fashion; however, Balkan
complexities are anything but linear in their interrelationships. In many ways, therefore, the discussion that
follows will be akin to using simple mathematics to explain
quantum mechanics. But readers cannot view the Balkans in such a
linear manner. They must connect the array of disparate and
incredibly complex issues in a broad context that weaves the
variegated strands of the Balkans into a coherent tapestry.
Complex crises such as the Balkans usually arise from a
combination of long-standing circumstances that set the stage for
an explosion and one or more proximate causes that spark the
detonation. The intent of this monograph is to illuminate the
long-term, deep running roots of the conflict to provide an
historical context for the current events in the Balkans. The
author refers the reader to a number of excellent works that
describe and analyze the more proximate causes of the current
crisis.5
Moreover, given the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia,
the focus is on the history of conflict in the region. This
approach is not intended to suggest that past conflict inexorably
or inevitably guarantees future conflict. The author recognizes
that other historical factors, to include peaceful relations
between the various ethnic groups, have been a part of the

historical record. Nonetheless, violence has significantly
influenced the course of historical events and–as current
evidence graphically illustrates–continues to shape conduct in
the Balkans.6
The report first outlines a brief history of the region that
sets the context for current conditions. The discussion next
examines the clash of languages, religions, ethnic groups, and
cultures that have shaped the region and brought the Balkan
cauldron to a boil. An examination of the political development
of the area and its influence on events follows. Based on this
background, the study then offers insights to assist
decisionmakers in their policy deliberations. The report next
assesses potential policy options, and offers some brief
conclusions.
Finally, while the study examines the Balkans as a whole,
greater attention will focus on matters relating to the former
Yugoslavia.
DEFINITIONS
The Balkans. For the purposes of this monograph, the Balkans
encompasses Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, European Turkey,
and the states spawned from the erstwhile Yugoslavia–BosniaHercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). (See Map 1.) Some
experts might exclude the European portion of Turkey from the
region. Current influence in the region and the fact that many
states in the Balkans once belonged to the Ottoman Empire argue,
however, for including Turkey. Other experts might suggest
including Hungary because of the large Hungarian minority in
Vojvodina, but Hungary falls more logically in Central Europe.
Hungarian minorities within the region will be addressed as
required. Romania will not be considered in great detail because
it remains generally aloof from the current crises.
Ethnic Identity. Ethnic identity is a critical concept for
U.S. leaders to understand. American political leaders and their
advisors may not fully appreciate the importance of ethnic or
national identity to many Europeans, particularly how this
concept shapes national or ethnic group policies. Indeed,
American policymakers may find ethnicity and ethnic identity
alien concepts, outside their cultural context, perhaps hiding or
at least obscuring the causes and potential solutions to ethnic
conflict.7 But, understanding the concept of ethnic identity is
the keystone to comprehending the complexities of an ethnic
conflict that might involve the United States.8
Defining ethnic identity in practical terms is no easy task,
however. James G. Kellas, long-time observer of nationalism and
ethnic groups, defines ethnicity as "the state of being ethnic,
or belonging to an ethnic group."9 On the other hand, experts on

ethnicity George De Vos and Anthony D. Smith define ethnic
identity more in terms of establishing and reinforcing the
differences between groups.10 These apparently divergent criteria
establish two important points for understanding ethnic identity.
First, a critical element of defining ethnic identity is
determining who cannot belong to the group. Membership is posed
in stark alternatives, with no room for compromise. Either you
are like me or you are not like me. Second, ethnic identity
usually is framed in a "zero sum game" context, where ethnic
groups view a gain by another group as their loss. Compromise,
therefore, is not viewed as a natural part of a political,
economic, or cultural process, but as a sign of weakness. When
carried to extremes, this argument can lead an ethnic group to
perceive its very existence threatened over even the most minute
issue.
As indicated in Figure 1, the primary ties that determine an
individual's ethnic affiliation begin with kin relationships. The
basic building block is the family which combines with other
families to form a clan.11 The tribe, ". . . the largest social
group defined primarily in terms of kinship, . . . is normally an
aggregate of clans,"12 follows next in the

ethnic hierarchy. While kin relationships form the core of ethnic
identity, observers must consider additional attributes that
contribute to an ethnic identity. The difficulty lies in
determining which traits do or do not apply to an ethnic group
and why, as well as the complex interactions between attributes.
Complicating this process is a lack of consensus on specific
attributes, a range of potential traits, or the minimum number
required to constitute ethnic identity. A given ethnic group, for
example, might display only a few traits, but still have a wellestablished identity. Alternatively, another group might display
many characteristics, but not possess a cohesive identity.
Attributes that help define one ethnic group might not apply in
another case, even though the groups appear remarkably similar.13
Conversely, two ethnic groups could share a wide number of
attributes, but still view themselves as distinct, perhaps
competing, ethnic identities.14
Race illustrates this challenge.15 On the one hand, for
example, race forms the sine qua non of German ethnic identity.16
On the other hand, while Croats, Muslims, and Serbs within the
erstwhile Yugoslavia derive from common racial origins, each

group uses differences in language (even though considered petty
by outsiders), religion (Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Serbian
Orthodox), and culture (Central European, Ottoman, and Byzantine)
to constitute a distinct ethnic identity.17
Equally important for analysts to grasp is that, while an
ethnic identity may coalesce around a collection of attributes,
ethnics also use these traits to separate themselves from other
groups. In this manner, attributes found in the center and outer
rings of Figure 1 may have dual, but contradictory, influences.
Two (or more) ethnic groups, for example, may identify with a
particular territory. Rather than serving as a unifying trait,
ethnic groups may compete for territorial control as they try to
bring all their members within the borders of a single "nationstate."18 At the same time, they may also exclude nonmembers from
that same territory; setting the stage for "ethnic cleansing."19
Thus, the very traits that form the basis for an ethnic identity
can be used to fracture a society along ethnic lines as the
various ethnic subgroups use these characteristics to integrate
themselves at the expense of others.
Finally, in assessing ethnic identity and its influence,
analysts must keep several key points in mind:
• Ethnic identity is important to Europeans, so important
that many people are willing to kill or to die to protect it.
• While it is possible to generalize about the attributes
that make up an ethnic group, the circumstances contributing to
the establishment of ethnic identity makes each one unique.
• To identify and assess the attributes that make up an
ethnic identity require that analysts possess manifold talents
and expertise; i.e., they must understand the general aspects of
ethnicity and ethnic identity, as well as have a detailed
knowledge of specific issues within regions or countries.
Nation-State. Although used almost interchangeably in the
United States, the terms "nation" and "state" are not synonymous,
and take on important distinctions in other parts of the world:
Europe and, especially, in the Balkans. According to Hugh SetonWatson, a noted scholar of nationalism, "A state is a legal and
political organisation [sic], with the power to require obedience
and loyalty from its citizens." On the other hand, Seton-Watson
defines a nation as ". . . a community of people, whose members
are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a
national consciousness."20 Thus, while it may be possible for a
"nation" and a "state" to correspond (hence the term nationstate), the two ideas do not have to coincide and habitually they
do not. Indeed, attempts in the Balkans over the centuries to
make nations (i.e., a community of people) coincidental with the
geographic boundaries of a state (i.e., a political entity) are
the root cause of many past, present, and future problems in the

region.
Yugoslavia. Lastly, although the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes became Yugoslavia only in 1929, Yugoslavia will be
used throughout the report to identify the state after 1918.
While Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist in 1991, Serbia and
Montenegro remain constituent republics within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
however, does not enjoy full international recognition.

CHAPTER 2
THE BALKANS:
HISTORICAL BATTLEGROUND
"What happened here yesterday?" you ask the "cleansers"
who took over the ruins. "Well, in 1389 . . ." explains
a Serb irregular fighter while waving a gun. "No, not
in 1389: yesterday," you interrupt . . . . "Under the
Ottoman Empire . . ." he tries again. "No, please! What
happened yesterday?" You get impatient. "Because in
1921, they . . ." You cannot give up, of course, so you
sigh and try again, until you get his version of the
events.
–A conversation in time21
An understanding of the past throws light on current
conditions in the Balkans. To paraphrase a concept borrowed from
social scientist Morris Massey, "What these nations are now
depends on where they were when."22 The brief historical outline
that follows, therefore, offers the reader a sense of the ebb and
flow of history across the Balkan stage; of the clash of empires,
states, religions, cultures, and ethnic groups that have beset
the region. The outline also provides an appreciation of the
magnitude and continuous nature of the violence that has swept
over the Balkans during the past two millennia.
GEOGRAPHY
An oftentimes overlooked, but key influence over a region's
historical development is its geographic character. This
condition holds true for the Balkans where geography has played a
critical role in the evolution of ethnic and national groups, as
well as in the cultural formation of the area. Before delving
into the region's history, therefore, a short excursion into its
geography is instructive.
"Balkan" is derived from the Turkish word for mountain and
the Balkan Peninsula could hardly be more aptly named: mountains
represent the predominant terrain feature in the region.23 The
great mountain chains crisscrossing the region–the Carpathian
Mountains in Romania, the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains of
Bulgaria, the Pindus Range of Greece, and the Dinaric Alps of the
former Yugoslavia and Albania (Map 2)--fragmented not only the
region's geography, but also its ethnic and political
development. In the first instance, the isolation and physical
compartmentalization of the peninsula mitigated against the
emergence of a cohesive ethnic or national identity. In the
second case, the combination of fragmented ethnic identities and
geographic divisions inhibited the development of a single large
power in the region and led, instead, to a number of smaller,
less powerful and competing states.24

Paradoxically, geographic circumstances promoted external
access to the region. Lying between Asia Minor and the
Mediterranean Sea to the east and south and the fertile European
plains to the north and west, three major migratory or invasion
routes cut across the Balkans. The first route runs along the
north shore of the Black Sea and then to the Danube into Central
Europe, or alternatively southeast through modern day Bulgaria to
Constantinople (Istanbul). A second path flows down the Danube
from Central Europe to Nis and diverges along two paths: down the
Vardar River through the Skopje Gate toward Thessaloniki; or
toward Sofia along the Maritsa River and then to Constantinople.
A third route begins in Italy, crosses the Adriatic, moves across
Albania and northern Greece, again terminating in Constantinople.
Finally, the extensive coastlines of the Adriatic, Aegean, and
Black Seas open the Balkans to penetration.25 As Balkan
historians Charles and Barbara Jelavich pointed out:
the peninsula is a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and
Africa. Here the peoples and cultures of three
continents have met and mingled, or clashed and
conquered. The major powers of each historical epoch
have made their influence felt here and left their
marks upon the peoples. The great imperial powers of
the past–Greeks, Romans, Turks, Venetians, Austrians,
Germans, French, British, and Russians–all in their
turn have dominated or sought to dominate this area.26
Of greater importance than the numbers of peoples and powers
that have moved through the area are the turmoil and violence
that followed in their wake. The long-term consequences of this
violence will primarily concern the discussion that follows.
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME
The recorded history of the Balkans begins with ancient
Greece. While much good can be said about the political and
cultural roots of ancient Greece, the area seethed with warfare.
While the Greeks successfully fended off outside, largely
Persian, invasion, the century-long conflicts between Athens and
Sparta and their respective allies for dominance on the Greek
peninsula (most notably, the Peloponnesian Wars [460-404 B.C.])
fatally weakened the Greek city-states.
Taking advantage of Greek vulnerabilities, Philip of Macedon
crushed the Greek armies and established Macedonian dominance in
the region.27 Upon his father's death, Alexander–whom peers and
history would dub the Great–consolidated his hold over the
remainder of Greece and rapidly expanded his empire through
conquest southward through Egypt and eastward through Persia to
India. After Alexander's untimely death (323 B.C.), his
successors proved unable to maintain his empire which quickly
collapsed under internal bickering and war. Elements of the
empire survived for some time, but an increasingly expansionist
Rome exerted considerable influence in the Balkans and, by 146

B.C., conquering legions consolidated Rome's hold over the entire
region.28
BYZANTINE EMPIRE
The Romans extended their empire over the next century, but
a further three centuries of Pax Romana did not mean an absence
of conflict within the Balkans.29 The Romans came under increasing
pressure, particularly from barbarian invasions emanating from
Western and Central Europe. The pressure became so intense that
in A.D. 326 Emperor Constantine transferred the administrative
capital of the empire to Byzantium, on the western shores of the
Bosporus (currently Istanbul).30
Divisions between the eastern and western halves of the
empire grew rapidly. By A.D. 395, the Roman Empire cleaved in two
with the border cutting across modern day Croatia and BosniaHercegovina. The importance of Byzantium (Constantinople)
increased considerably thereafter, and when the western portion
of the empire collapsed under the barbarian invasions of the 5th
and 6th centuries, the Byzantine Empire emerged as a major actor
on the world stage.31
While the Byzantine Empire retained control of the Balkans
for most of the next millennia, continuous conflict raged across
the periphery of the empire and then ever closer to
Constantinople. Of special concern to the Balkans, Bulgar and
Slav encroachments continually pressured the empire from the
north, which the Byzantines brutally resisted.32 Slavery, immense
cruelties, or outright annihilation awaited the defeated. For
example, one Byzantine Emperor, Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, not
content with annihilating his opponents, had 14,000 captives
blinded and sent home as an example.33
Despite pressures from the north, the more critical threat
rose in the east, where first Arabs, then Persians and Ottomans
assaulted the Byzantines. Inexorably, these groups wore away at
the empire, until the Ottomans successfully besieged
Constantinople in 1453, putting an end to over 1000 years of
Byzantine rule in the Balkans.34
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
The fall of Constantinople firmly established the Ottomans
in the Balkans, but did not end the brutality that would continue
to rack the region. The repressive nature of the Ottoman Empire
made violence and brutality commonplace.35 Not unnaturally,
oppressive measures led to numerous and equally brutal revolts
that the Ottomans savagely crushed.36 Reprisal begot reprisal in
an escalating spiral that increased in frequency and scope
throughout the Ottoman occupation. Sadly, as current reports of
atrocities, mutilations, and rapes indicate, such brutality
remains far too commonplace.37

Many peasants took to the mountains to avoid taxes,
harassment, and repression of Ottoman rule. To survive they
resorted to banditry. But, because these groups also participated
in insurrections against the Ottomans, they acquired the
reputation of national heroes rather than mere brigands; a Balkan
form of Robin Hood. Hajduks in Serbia, Uskoks in Croatia and
Dalmatia, Haiduks in Bulgaria, and Klephts in Greece38 established
the long tradition of armed resistance against governments or
outsiders. Reinforced by the Partisan experience in World War II,
this tradition continues with the numerous ethnic and religious
irregular forces currently running amok in the wars in what was
once Yugoslavia.39
As a result of the ebb and flow of Ottoman campaigns to
expand their empire north and west into Central Europe, the
Balkans remained the scene of nearly continuous violence for the
next six centuries (1400s-1900s).40 Because the Austrian Empire
and the Kingdom of Hungary immediately abutted the Ottomans, the
clash of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires dominated life in the
Balkans until the early 20th century.41 While the Ottomans reached
their peak at the first siege of Vienna in 1529, the long decline
of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans began only after the Turkish
defeat outside Vienna in 1683. Shortly after the Treaty of
Karlowitz (1699),42 mutual exhaustion, Habsburg preoccupation with
affairs in Central and Western Europe, and Turkish concerns with
Russian encroachment from the north stabilized frontiers in the
Balkans for nearly a century.43 This stalemate further reinforced
the existing religious, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic fault
line that cut across the heart of the Balkans from the 4th
century and which continues to divide the region to this day.
Conflict became a way of life along this dividing line,
particularly along the Austrian Military Frontier between the
Habsburg and Ottoman empires. Officially established in the 17th
century, the zone stretched originally across what would be the
modern day borders between Slovenia and Croatia, and, as Turkish
power waned, advanced south into the general area of what today
is known as the Krajina region of Bosnia-Hercegovina.44
Interested in defending their hard fought gains from further
Turkish incursions, but increasingly preoccupied with threats
from Central and Western Europe, the Habsburgs populated the
region with farmers cum soldiers who received land in return for
defending Habsburg lands.45 This practice led to the development
of a warrior caste in the region, for even if the two empires did
not directly wage "war," both sides skirmished continuously for
military advantage and territorial acquisition. Peoples along the
frontier had long suffered harsh treatment under the Ottomans,
and oftentimes responded in kind.46 The result was that for the
next two centuries the Balkans served as a battleground between
the two massive empires.47
Imperial Austrian practices for populating the region with
soldier-farmers also contributed to the ethnic patchwork that

evolved in the region. Habsburg subjects, especially Roman
Catholic Croats, originally populated the area. But increasing
Ottoman pressure in the southern Balkans drove large numbers of
refugees, largely Orthodox Serbs, into Croatia. Perennially short
of military colonists, the Habsburgs accelerated this movement by
granting freedom of worship to all Orthodox adherents who would
settle in the area. This stimulus, combined with small land
grants, direct rule from Vienna, relief from manorial
obligations, and a share of any captured booty, induced large
numbers of ethnic Serbs to settle in the Krajina region. This
resulted in Serb majorities, or at least strong minorities,
sprinkled throughout the region. Later failure, however, to live
up to these incentives created considerable tensions that
frequently led to open revolts by the Serb population.48
The Napoleonic era brought a surge of nationalist activity
and violence to the Balkans. Serbia seethed in revolt from 180413 and again from 1815-17, winning partial autonomy.49 Not
satisfied, the Serbs continued their efforts at freeing all Serbs
from the Ottoman Empire, frequently leading to attacks on local
Muslim populations.50 The Greek Revolution from 1823-29 cleaved
off the lower Peloponnesus from the Ottoman Empire.51 These
successes did not come without costs, particularly in human
lives. Nor were all efforts successful. In Bulgaria, for example,
failed revolts in 1834, 1849, 1850, 1853, and 1876 resulted in
harsh reprisals.52
Centrifugal and nationalist tendencies also affected the
Austrian Empire. With the breakdown of the Concert of Europe
after the Crimean War (1856), German domination of Central Europe
from 1871, and Russian activity after the Treaty of San Stefano
(1878), Austrian attention turned to the Balkans. But, like their
Ottoman opponents, the Habsburgs faced the rising power of
Russia, which also coveted the Balkans. France and Great Britain
saw no advantage to Austrians or Russians adding to their empires
at the expense of the Turks. Thus, by the second half of the 19th
century, the Balkans had become the central arena of Great Power
competition in Europe. These conditions further heightened
tensions, and conflicts increased in frequency, size, and
intensity as the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires continued to
disintegrate.53
Rising tensions came to a new peak with the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-78. While the origins and conduct of the war are not
significant for this discussion, it is interesting that, like
many subsequent emergencies, events in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1875
and Serbian attacks on the Ottomans in support of their brethren
in Bosnia-Hercegovina precipitated the crisis. The consequences
of the Russo-Turkish War are more important for this analysis.
Under the Russian imposed terms of the Treaty of San Stefano
(March 3, 1878), Serbia, Romania, and an enlarged Montenegro
received independence. Equally significant, an autonomous and
greatly augmented Bulgaria emerged that stretched from Serbia to
the Black Sea and included extensive territory in Thrace,

abutting the Aegean Sea.54
The remaining Great Powers, particularly Great Britain and
Austria, expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty and provoked a
European crisis. Again, one need only be concerned with the
consequences. At the Congress of Berlin (June 13-July 13, 1878),
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Imperial Germany served as the
"honest broker" who crafted a compromise solution for the
distribution of Ottoman spoils. While superficially meeting the
demands of the Great Powers, the Habsburgs and Russians remained
dissatisfied with the results and the seeds of future Great Power
conflict had been sown.55
The Congress of Berlin also dashed nationalist aspirations
of the smaller Balkan states. The Congress cut Bulgaria into
thirds with only the territory north of the Balkan Mountains
retaining the autonomy granted less than three months earlier
under the Treaty of San Stefano. The Greeks received nothing but
promises of negotiations with the Turks. While Montenegro,
Serbia, and Romania retained their independence, all three lost
territory gained under the Treaty of San Stefano. Moreover, the
Habsburg mandate over Bosnia-Hercegovina angered Serbia and
Montenegro.56 In sum, according to the noted European historian
Carlton J. H. Hayes, "If before 1878 the ‘Eastern Question'
concerned one ‘sick man', after 1878 it involved a half-dozen
maniacs. For the Congress of Berlin drove the Balkan peoples
mad."57
Little time elapsed before the first sparks flew. An
unsuccessful revolt racked Albania in 1880, and in 1881 the
Ottomans ceded Epirus (with its largely Albanian population) (see
Map 3) to Greece, further agitating Albanian nationalists and
raising Albania to the international stage.58 In 1885, Eastern
Rumelia revolted and joined with Bulgaria, provoking another
European crisis. British and Habsburg opposition to Russian
initiatives further increased tensions. The crisis worsened when
the Serbs attacked Bulgaria, suffered a drubbing, and were saved
only through Austrian intervention.59
Tensions rose further in 1898 when Greece attacked its
Ottoman neighbor in support of Cretan enosis (union) with Greece.
The Turks decisively defeated the Greeks, and subsequently
invaded Greece, only to have the Great Powers intervene. In the
end, the Greeks lost the war and paid a small indemnity, and
Crete received autonomous status, but without union with Greece;
a solution that only dissatisfied all participants.60
PRE-WORLD WAR I
By the turn of the 20th century, nationalist passions had
reached a fever pitch, and conflicts raged across the region with
little respite as nations great and small fought over the
carcasses of the declining Habsburg and Ottoman empires. In 1908,
Bulgaria gained its independence, fanning nationalist flames

throughout the region. More importantly, also in 1908, Austria
annexed Bosnia- Hercegovina, frustrating Serbian nationalist

aspirations for that territory and dealing the Russians a
humiliating diplomatic defeat, both of which would have severe
repercussions.61
Within short order, Southeastern Europe suffered the First
Balkan War (1912) between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, on the
one hand, and the Ottomans on the other. Rapidly defeating the
Turks, the victorious allies soon fell to squabbling over the
division of Macedonia and Albania. Serbian and Greek designs on
Albania particularly upset Austria and Italy which did not want
to see any strong power, specifically Serbia, established on the
Adriatic coast. As a result, the Great Powers again imposed a
peace settlement on the Balkans that left nationalist
expectations unfulfilled.62
Feeling isolated and not trusting its erstwhile allies,
Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia, starting the Second Balkan
War (June 1913). In a remarkable turnaround, the Ottomans joined
the Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians in quickly defeating Bulgaria.
By means of the Treaty of Bucharest, however, the Great Powers
again imposed a territorial solution upon the region. Serbia and
Greece received those parts of Macedonia they had seized, but not
the full amounts they desired. Bulgaria retained only a part of
Macedonia, and kept a small coastline in Thrace along the Aegean
Sea, but lost Thessaloniki to Greece. While Greece gained
territory at Bulgarian expense, the concomitant establishment of
an independent Albania meant Greece received only a portion of
Epirus, all of which it coveted. The Ottomans recovered
Adrianople and territory up to the Maritsa River, but still
suffered the loss of considerable territory relative to 1911.
Only the Romanians, who obtained southern Dobrudja, and the
Albanians, who achieved their independence, expressed
satisfaction with the final settlement. The other states could be
expected to seek redress at the earliest opportunity.63
WORLD WAR I
Gavrilo Princip (an ethnic Bosnian Serb terrorist intent on
promoting union of Bosnia-Hercegovina with Serbia) provided that
opportunity in June 1914, when he assassinated Archduke Francis
Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo. The events that turned the
third Balkan War into World War I, as well as the events of the
war, are well known and will not be repeated here. However,
several key consequences of the war merit further discussion.
First, the various alignments of the powers during the
course of the war, both within and outside the region,
contributed to unresolved tensions that continued to afflict the
region after the post-war settlements. For example, Bulgarian
support of the Central Powers and murderous occupation of
Macedonia and Montenegro only increased Serbian hatred of their
eastern neighbor.64 Similarly, Greek entry into the war against
Bulgaria and Turkey only further sharpened centuries-old
animosities.

A second critical consequence of the war was the
considerable devastation that significantly set back the
agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.65 More
importantly, nations in the region paid a high cost in human
suffering that fed tensions in the post-war era. The plight of
Yugoslavia is illustrative. According to documents provided at
the Versailles Peace Conference, Yugoslavia suffered 1,900,000
deaths (from all causes) during World War I. Of the 705,343 men
Serbia mobilized during the war, 369,815 were killed or died of
wounds. This represented nearly one-half of the young male
population–a demographic disaster that continues to plague
Serbia.66
Finally, most states within the Balkans perceived the peace
treaties following the war to be imposed and unjust. As a result,
they served only to exacerbate old wounds. Bulgarian claims to an
outlet on the Aegean Sea, competing claims over Macedonia, and
Yugoslav complaints over Italy receiving parts of Illyria and the
Dalmatian Coast only fostered further resentment.67 Territorial
settlements created future difficulties as numerous ethnic
minority situations emerged from a "fair and lasting peace."68
INTER-WAR ERA
While World War I ended in Western Europe in November 1918,
war in the Balkans did not. Perceived inequities of the peace
settlements, coupled with newly invigorated Turkish nationalism
and Greek adventurism in Asia Minor, lead to the Greco-Turkish
War of 1921-22. Although the Greeks enjoyed initial success, the
Turks eventually soundly defeated them. Both sides suffered heavy
losses, but Turkish actions in clearing out Greek enclaves in
Asia Minor lead to many civilian casualties. After routing the
Greeks from Asia Minor, the Turks pushed beyond the Maritsa River
in Thrace, where hostilities ceased.69
The aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War had key consequences
that would vex Balkan relations for decades. First, a resurgent
and nationalist Turkey rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.
And, although the Turks had defeated Greece and triumphed over
the harsh Treaty of Sevres, they remained humiliated by their
long imperial decline and defeats during World War I. Second,
Greek sacrifices during World War I went for nought, as Greece
surrendered much of the territory gained under earlier
agreements; a humiliation that deeply rankled the country.70
Third, to resolve permanently the intermingling of Greek and
Turkish populations, approximately 1.3 million Greeks and 380,000
Turks were forcibly exchanged. As might be expected, the
conditions took a considerable toll in human suffering and the
Greeks, particularly, were ill prepared to receive the massive
numbers of refugees involved.71
But, as noted Balkan historian L.S. Stavrianos pointed out,
this exchange represents only the last in a long series of

migrations. Approximately 100,000 ethnic Turks fled in the wake
of the First Balkan War (1912), and the Second Balkan War (1913)
brought the emigration of roughly 50,000 Turks, 70,000 Greeks,
and 60,000 Bulgarians. At the outbreak of World War I, roughly
250,000 Moslems fled Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans and
approximately 135,000 Greeks left eastern Thrace. Thus, between
1912-23, roughly 2.2 million people were uprooted from homes they
had occupied for centuries.72
Despite the massive extent of these migrations,
approximately 100,000 ethnic Greeks remained in Constantinople
(which had not been subject to the exchange) and 100,000 Turks
remained in western Thrace to balance the Greeks in
Constantinople. Thus, the seeds for future ethnic conflict bear
fruit today in continued agitation over treatment of Turkish
minorities in Greece.73
Nor did other countries in the region fare well in the
inter-war years. States experimented briefly with democratic
government, but largely exchanged Habsburg or Ottoman
authoritarianism for national dictatorships. Ethnic
discrimination also increased. The net result was that
authoritarian regimes of the inter-war era failed to resolve
outstanding religious, ethnic, and nationalist problems left over
from World War I. Instead, they barely capped popular rage and
problems simmered just below the surface awaiting the opportunity
to burst once again on the European scene.
WORLD WAR II
The opportunity came quickly with the onset of the Nazi
Drang nach Osten [expansion toward the east]. Although Hitler
aimed his policies predominantly at the Soviet Union, he felt
unable to advance against the Soviets without a secure southern
flank. Germany also needed the key resources of the Balkan
region. Throughout 1939 to early 1941, therefore, the Nazis
cemented their relationships with the other revisionist powers
(Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) in the region. When, in April
and May 1941, Yugoslavia and Greece failed to yield to Hitler's
demands, the Germans quickly overran and occupied both nations.74
The Balkans suffered terribly during the war years. Even
those states that initially sided with the Germans eventually
felt Soviet invasion and retribution from German and Russian
alike. The Greek and Yugoslav examples represent, perhaps, the
most severe cases, because they actively fought the occupier.
German and Italian reprisals exacted a tremendous toll on both
states, but especially Yugoslavia.
The severity of the Yugoslav case and its effects on the
current situation in the Balkans deserve closer attention. Total
casualties came to approximately 1.7 million dead out of a
population of 16 million.75 The numbers of wounded and maimed can
only be guessed. Coupled with the massive losses sustained in

World War I, two generations of Yugoslavs effectively had been
wiped out. Continuous fighting decimated the agricultural and
industrial infrastructure of the Yugoslav economy. More
importantly, perhaps, were the scars left by the ideological
civil war, with its intense ethnic and religious overtones, waged
by communists, royalists, and ultranationalists that helped set
the stage for the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia.
POST-WORLD WAR II
The years immediately following World War II did not see an
end to conflict in the Balkans. From 1943-49, civil war tortured
Greece. Yugoslavs settled scores of their civil war probably
until 1947, when Tito's Communist regime managed to cap the
majority of the violence. The extent of the violence and the
strains that divided the Balkans are, perhaps, best summed up in
novelist Nikos Kazantzakis description of the Greek Civil War
(1944-49):
[the inhabitants] were not surprised when the killing
began, brother against brother. They were not afraid;
they did not change their way of life. But what had
been simmering slowly within them, mute and unrevealed,
now burst out, insolent and free. The primeval passion
of man to kill poured from within them. Each had a
neighbor, or a friend, or a brother, whom he had hated
for years, without reason, often without realizing it.
The hate simmered there, unable to find an outlet. And
now, suddenly, they were given rifles and hand
grenades; noble flags waved over their heads. The
clergy, the army, the press urged them on–to kill their
neighbor, their friend, their brother. Only in this
manner, they shouted to them, can faith and country be
saved. Murder, the most ancient need of man, took on a
high, mystic meaning. And the chase began–brother
hunting brother.76
The post-World War II division of the Balkans temporarily
checked the incessant warfare that has plagued the region.
Largely the result of the imposition of Communist regimes in
Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria and the fear that
local conflict could lead to superpower involvement, the region
entered a seeming state of suspended historical animation. As the
revolutions of 1989 awoke these states and the specter of
superpower confrontation receded, past animosities quickly
bubbled to the surface. Conflict first erupted in the former
Yugoslavia and threatens to spill over into the Balkans as a
whole. Thus, for reasons that will be more fully explored in the
next chapter, the region has once again assumed its historical
role as the Balkan battleground.

CHAPTER 3
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CONFLICT:
77
LANGUAGE, RELIGION, ETHNIC ORIGIN AND CULTURE
Why do we kill the children? Because some day they will
grow up and then we will have to kill them.
– A Serbian insurgent in Bosnia78
Just as enormous pressures created the chaotic physical
geography of the Balkans, so, too, have language, religion,
ethnic origin, and culture exerted great forces on the region.
These forces have no less impact today and undoubtedly will
continue to vex policymakers as they grapple with the intractable
issues that emerge from the flow of history.
Individually analyzing these issues presents a considerable
challenge. Within the Balkans, language, religious identity, and
ethnic origin are too closely intertwined to be addressed
separately and the complexity of assessing these issues assumes
an exponential function. Thus, although issues are addressed
separately in the discussion that follows, the reader must remain
aware that they are not isolated in the real world.
LANGUAGE DIVISIONS
As a result of the massive migrations that passed through
the Balkans, a variety of languages are spoken within the region.
Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Serbo-Croat (or Croato-Serb,
depending upon ethnic origin), Slovenian, and Turkish are
official languages. Although many consider Macedonian a dialect,
the existence of an independent Macedonia argues for its
inclusion as an official language. Numerous ethnic minorities
within the region speak other languages: German, Hungarian, and
Italian, for example.79
What makes this phenomenon of more than passing interest to
policymakers is that language is inextricably linked with
religious and ethnic identity. The spoken or written language
immediately establishes an individual's ethnic identity and,
perhaps, state or nation. Only Greeks, for example, speak Greek.
The same for Turks. Even within a country, the concept applies.
Within the former Yugoslavia, for example, dialects divide the
official language along ethnic lines. Even though few
distinctions exist (differences between "Croatian" and "Serbian"
are oftentimes less than the variations in some dialects of
"Croatian"80), Croats adamantly speak Croatian, while Serbs and
Montenegrins rigidly speak Serbian.81
A more distinct difference occurs in the written word where
Serbs and Montenegrins write in Cyrillic, while Croats and
Muslims use the Latin or Roman alphabet.82 The choice of alphabet,

then, immediately marks ethnic origin or "national identity." The
language or alphabet used may also mark an individual's religious
affiliation, as Cyrillic generally is the alphabet of Orthodoxy.
And, while the use of the Latin alphabet does not necessarily
identify the religious affiliation of the user (i.e., Catholics,
Protestants, and Muslims use the Roman alphabet), it does
identify what the individual is not: Orthodox or Serb.
The consequences of the proliferation of languages in this
area, and, particularly, the establishment of "official"
languages along ethnic lines have long exerted strong influences
on the region. In the words of Balkan expert Barbara Jelavich:
The efforts of scholars and politicians to divide these
peoples by neat lines into Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs,
and, later, Macedonians, with language as a chief
consideration, was to lead to recrimination and hatred
in the future.83
Unfortunately for policymakers, Jelavich's future is today and
will undoubtedly extend further into time.
RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS
Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy (subdivided into Serbian,
Greek, and Eastern), Islam, and a variety of Protestant sects are
practiced within the region. Religion, like language, is
inextricably bound to ethnic issues, as religious identity first
served as the basis for determining ethnicity and, later,
nationality.84 Like much of early modern Europe, Christianity
based on the Roman Catholic Church predominated throughout the
region. Prior to the fall of Rome, Emperor Constantine the Great
transferred the seat of government to Constantinople, but the
seat of Catholicism remained in Rome. Because of the close links
between church and state in Constantinople, church leaders took
on increasing importance in the competition between Rome and
Constantinople for control of the church. Small doctrinal
differences eventually grew to major proportions that culminated
in the "Great Schism" of 1054 and the emergence of two separate
and doctrinally distinct churches: the Roman Catholic and Eastern
Orthodox–which have significantly complicated matters in the
Balkans to this very day.85
The geographic dividing line between the two churches fell
squarely across the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes remained under
the religious rule of the Pope in Rome. Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs,
and Orthodox Romanians came under control of the Patriarch in
Constantinople.86 The two branches of the Christian Church
continued to draw apart and Croats have remained overwhelmingly
Roman Catholic and Serbs have clung fast to Orthodoxy, further
alienating their respective followers from each other.87
The religious situation in the region became ever more
complicated with the arrival of the Ottomans and Islam. The Turks

practiced considerable religious toleration, at least among Jews
and Christians who as "people of the Book" (Koran) were not
forced to convert to Islam. That said, the Ottomans mistreated
non-Muslims who suffered economic and civil discrimination.88 To
avoid such discrimination, voluntary conversions to Islam
occurred throughout the Balkans, mostly in Albania and Bosnia.89
Because of these circumstances, some, more radical, Christian
Slavs, especially Croats and Serbs, do not consider Muslims a
separate ethnic group deserving of its place within the Balkans,
but simply apostate Serbs (or Croats) who should be returned to
the fold–forcibly if necessary.90
Turkish religious toleration resulted in Christian Churches
enjoying considerable autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, which
would have important consequences. Because of the doctrinaire
inflexibility of the Roman Church, aided and abetted by the
Habsburg monarchy, many of the Orthodox hierarchy preferred
Ottoman rule to expansion of Catholicism.91 Ottoman policies also
had an effect beyond spiritual differences as religions became
identified with the various ethnic groups.92 For example, when the
Patriarch of Pec and 30,000 followers defected to Austria in
1766, the Ottomans replaced him with a Greek. Thereafter, Greeks
held the position, which caused considerable animus: the Serbs
took offense at Turkish interference with the Serbian Orthodox
Church and resented the Greeks for being Ottoman stooges. A
similar situation occurred in Bulgaria, where Greeks controlled
the Orthodox Church and became identified with the ruling Ottoman
class.93 Religious issues, therefore, reinforced ethnic tensions.
In an interesting paradox, the relative religious freedom
within the Ottoman Empire and the propensity to identify
religious affiliation with a specific ethnic group combined to
make local churches the principal symbol of nationalism within
the Balkans. The Serbian Orthodox Church, for example, became the
sole remaining expression of anything "Serbian" and, thus, the
focus of Serbian nationalism under the Ottomans. Similarly, the
Latin Church was a significant element that made the Croats
different from Serbs; therefore, the Catholic Church served as
the rallying point for Croatian nationalism versus the Serbs.94
Unfortunately, this also meant that religious organizations
increasingly became drawn into ethnic and nationalist conflicts.
These difficulties continued into modern Yugoslavia. A
telling example of the levels of animosity may be found in the
crisis of 1937. In an attempt to appease the Croatian population,
the Yugoslav government negotiated a Concordat with the Vatican
that would have granted the Roman Church and its adherents
greater freedoms within Yugoslavia. When the Concordat came
before the Skupstina (parliament) for approval, a storm of
outrage broke over Serbia. The Synod of the Orthodox Church
immediately excommunicated government ministers of the Orthodox
faith, as well as parliamentary members who had voted for the
Concordat. Moreover, the Serbian peasantry and middle class saw
the move as a capitulation to Croatia. Even Croats, who would

benefit from the Concordat, viewed the document with suspicion,
fearing a Serbian ploy to break their opposition to the
government. As a result, the Concordat had to be withdrawn.95
Thus, a plan genuinely intended to improve internal relations led
instead to increased ethnic, nationalist, and religious enmity.
ETHNIC DIVISIONS
Ethnic diversity represents the most problematic division
within the Balkans. Ethnic composition was largely set by the end
of the 9th century when the last wave of migrations broke over
the Balkans.96 But even at this early time, no ethnically pure
groups remained in the region. True, a band of Slavic speaking
people separated Romanians and Hungarians in the north from
Albanians and Greeks to the south, but no group, despite their
boasts, could prove ethnic purity.97
The expansion and later contraction of the Ottoman Empire
significantly increased ethnic intermingling. The Ottomans
initially pushed the Serbs north and west, where sizeable groups
settled in southern Hungary, Slavonia, western Bosnia, Croatia,
and Dalmatia. (See Map 3.) Displaced Serbs crowded Croats into
Austria, Slovenia, and southwest Hungary. With the contraction of
the Ottoman Empire, large segments of the displaced populations
migrated southward once again. The net result of this ebb and
flow of populations across the Balkans, and particularly
Yugoslavia, has been the creation of a patchwork ethnic quilt
that continues to this day.98 (See Map 4 and Figure 2.)
This ethnic patchwork has considerably hindered the
development of harmonious nationalist movements within the
Balkans. As William Pfaff has pointed out: "In . . . Balkan
Europe, nationality is identified with ethnic or religious
background,"99 and these ethnic and religious divisions and
distributions frustrated the ability of groups to coalesce around
one, single unifying "nation." Concomitantly, harsh, repressive
Ottoman rule posed considerable obstacles to the rise of
nationalism, as the Turks crushed political dissent at the
earliest opportunity.100
Despite these impediments, nascent nationalism always
existed throughout the Balkans. But, unable to consolidate around
a single unifying definition of nation, ethnic groups coalesced
around their language and religion and hearkened back to the
glory days of their respective national kingdoms.101 Bulgarians
have looked to the First Bulgarian Empire (893-927) or the empire
of Tsar John Asen II (1218-41), when Bulgaria stretched from the
Adriatic to the Aegean to the Black Seas.102 Greeks, on the other
hand, sought to emulate Alexander the Great and create a nationstate that united all Hellenes in the Balkans.103 Croats traced
their nationhood back to the Pacta Conventa (1102) that
established a Croatian state under Magyar rule that encompassed
the northwest corner of the Balkans.104 Serbs based their national
claims on the domain of Stephen Dusan (1321-55) when Serbia

included parts of Albania, Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly and
extended from the Aegean to the Adriatic; the Danube to the Gulf
of Corinth.105
Establishment of these independent kingdoms 800-1000 years
ago is no mere historical footnote. As Stavrianos pointed out:
First, it should be noted that the past–even the very
distant past–and the present are side by side in the
Balkans. Centuries chronologically removed from each
other are really contemporary. Governments and peoples,
particularly intellectuals, have based their attitudes
and actions on what happened, or what they believed
happened, centuries ago. The reason is that during
almost five centuries of Turkish rule the Balkan people
had no history. Time stood still for them.
Consequently, when they won their independence in the
nineteenth century their point of reference was the
pre-Turkish period–to the medieval ages or beyond.106

Although written in 1958, these sentiments currently
reverberate throughout the erstwhile Yugoslavia. A Croatian
fighter in Mostar, Bosnia-Hercegovina declares, "Don't forget,
this was all part of Croatia in 1101 . . . Muslims and Serbs took
it away from us."107 Or, the Serb irregular fresh from "cleansing"
who, when asked, "What happened here yesterday?" replies "Well,
in 1389 . . .," or "Under the Ottomans," or "Because in 1921 they
. . . ." to justify his actions.108 The trek of over 1,000,000
Serbs to the "Field of the Blackbirds" in Kosovo in 1989 to
commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman victory that
ended an independent Serbia best illustrates, perhaps, the depth
of historical attachment in this region.109
Equally important is that many ethnic groups use these
historical claims to justify their current territorial demands;
many of which overlap significantly.110 And, if past or present
rhetoric is any indication, no side appears willing to compromise
on the extent of its claim.111 Instead of being a forgotten page
of history, these antecedents provide considerable grist for
conflict, as the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia graphically
illustrates.
Only after considerable decline in Ottoman power (i.e., the
late 18th and 19th centuries) could nationalism gather momentum.
Indeed, not until the Napoleonic Revolution could the peoples of
the Balkans establish and sustain a national identity.112 Even
then, however, popular expectations went largely unfulfilled.
Great Power concerns over the division of Ottoman spoils
oftentimes deferred nationalist hopes as boundaries failed to
incorporate large segments of an ethnic population. Thus, the
continuing–but apparently impossible to fulfill–desire to bring
all segments of an ethnic group under one nation only stoked the
fires of nationalism until the next conflict inevitably burst on
the scene.113
The participation of various ethnic groups in World War I
increased these strains. Large numbers of Croats fought for the
Habsburg Empire against Serbia, and Croatian and Slovene
politicians actively supported the Habsburgs.114 Early in the war,
Muslims living in Serbia fought with the Serbs against the
Austrians. When Turkey later entered the war, many Muslims
believed a secret agreement had been reached between Turkey and
Austria that would return Bosnia-Hercegovina to Turkish rule.
Many Muslims, therefore, left Serbian service, and fought against
the Serbs.115 More importantly, for an understanding of current
events in the Balkans, Croats collected Serbs and Bosnians into
as many as seven concentration camps, the most infamous being
Doboj. According to Dedijer, et al., tens of thousands of Serbs
and Bosnian Serbs died in these camps, largely through disease
and neglect.116 The fighting in World War I, thus, took on not
only a strong nationalistic propensity against outside
oppressors, but also an ethnic and religious bent.
The creation of Yugoslavia in the wake of World War I offers

an excellent illustration of the failure to soothe ethnic and
nationalist sentiments. Convinced they could not survive as
independent states, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina
opted for union with Serbia rather than run the risk of being
swallowed up by another more powerful and non-Slavic neighbor
(e.g., Italy or Hungary). Like most marriages of convenience, the
participants entered into the agreement with decidedly different
views of the pre-nuptial agreement–one side pursued a Greater
Serbia dominated by Belgrade, while the other sought a loose,
federal system with considerable autonomy.117
Nor were the Yugoslavs the only dissatisfied parties.
Romania doubled in size, but only at the expense of other states
within the region, particularly Hungary. Greece obtained a small
portion of Thrace from Bulgaria, but felt betrayed when denied
the full territorial concessions offered to entice Greece into
the war. Defeated Bulgaria suffered partial dismemberment that
led to discontent and irredentism in the post-World War I era.118
Additionally, ethnic discrimination oftentimes worsened in
the inter-war era. For example, the Yugoslav government viewed
any dissent as treason and took harsh repressive actions.
Croatians, Albanians, and Macedonians suffered considerably under
the Serbian dominated government. The Serbs were not alone in
this practice, as other ethnic cum national leaders in Yugoslavia
took to calling minorities foreigners, even if ethnic groups had
lived in the region for generations.119
The onset of World War II once again brought forth the
ethnic genie in the Balkans. After conquering the Balkans,
Germany planned to deport Slovenes from Lower Styria and Serbs
from Croatia and Bosnia. Although the massive scale of forced
emigration did not occur because of the uprising against the
occupiers, the Nazis deported roughly 50,000 Slovenes, and
another 200,000 Serbs and Slovenes moved of their own accord to
avoid the deportations.120 Nor were the Germans alone as
animosities throughout the region motivated other ethnic groups
to settle old scores. Bulgarians carried out mass expulsions of
Serbs in Macedonia and introduced large numbers of Bulgarian
colonists in the area. Hungarians expelled thousands of Serbs,
Gypsies, and Jews from their occupied areas.121
More important for the purposes of this monograph, the
ethnic- and ultranationalist-based hatred that surfaced during
the course of the Yugoslav civil war, which continues to plague
that erstwhile state today, deserves special attention. Within
five days of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, the puppet Ustasi
regime had been established in Croatia. As early as May 2, 1941,
Milovan Zanic, Minister of the Legislative Council of the
Independent State of Croatia, declared in a note of instruction:
This country can only be a Croatian country, and there
is no method we would hesitate to use in order to make
it truly Croatian and cleanse [added emphasis] it of

Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us and who
will endanger us again if they are given the
opportunity.122
Shortly thereafter, reprisals against Serbs and Muslims
began. Outright murder and massacres became commonplace. "Ethnic
cleansing," the current hot buzz word, began in earnest as the
Ustasi forced hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Muslims to
emigrate from their homelands in Croatia or to convert to
Catholicism.
Once the Ustasi campaign began, Serbs, most prominently
under Colonel Drazha Mihailovic and his Chetniks, defended
themselves. The Chetniks held strong nationalistic, Greater
Serbia, anti-Croatian, and anti-Communist beliefs, and seemed
only secondarily concerned with the German or Italian invaders.
Moreover, Mihailovic proved unable to control many separate
Chetnik groups which acted as little more
than brigands who
attacked whoever happened to be nearest.123
During this same time, the largely Communist (but panYugoslav) Partisan movement under Joseph Broz, better known as
Tito, began guerrilla operations against the Axis occupiers.
Although ethnically Croatian, the strong anti-Communist bent of
the Ustasi and orders from Stalin drove Tito to take up arms
against the Nazis and their Croatian allies. Initially, he
established his forces in and around Zagreb, but Ustasi and
German pressure forced him to move into Serbian territory, where
he set up his headquarters in the vicinity of Belgrade.124
This move immediately brought him into conflict with
Mihailovic, and by November 1941, the two men and their
organizations stood at dagger points. This circumstance initially
resulted as much from tactical differences as ideologic ones. The
Germans carried out brutal reprisals against any Partisan actions
and, because both groups operated predominantly from Serbian
territory, Serbs suffered the brunt of the reprisals. After
German raids in Kragujevac resulted in the deaths of over 8,000–
including hundreds of children–Mihailovic suspended operations
against Axis forces to avoid further reprisals and focused on
survival of his troops until such time that liberation seemed
closer at hand.125
Tito, on the other hand, continued his operations. These
actions, combined with ideological (i.e., communist versus
royalist) and ethnic differences, resulted in the Chetniks
actively cooperating with the Germans and Italians in antiPartisan operations from November 1941 onwards.126 Thus began a
four way civil war among the Ustasi, Chetniks, Partisans, and
rump Serbia under Nedic that escalated in scope and level of
violence until the end of World War II.127 An indication of the
levels of hatred and nationalist sentiment involved can be found
in an anecdote concerning the Croatian leader Vladko Macek and
one of his guards, a devout Catholic. When Macek asked the man if

he feared God's punishment for his actions, the guard replied:
Don't talk to me about that . . . for I am perfectly
aware of what is in store for me. For my past, present,
and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least I
shall burn for Croatia.128
The civil and ethnic war quickly spread beyond CroatianSerbian warfare as both sides also settled old scores with the
Muslim community.129 Muslims later joined with Croats in reprisals
against the Serbs. Muslims also enlisted in two SS divisions–the
Albanian SS "Skanderbeg" Division and the Croatian/Bosnian SS
"Handschar" (Scimitar) Division–that participated in the numerous
German anti-Partisan operations and carried out indiscriminate
attacks against Partisans and civilians alike.130 In many ways it
became difficult to separate the civil and ethnic wars from the
religious aspects of the centuries old conflicts in the region.131
The costs of this civil-ethnic-religious war were
staggering. Estimates indicate that upwards of 300,000 Serbs may
have been forcibly converted to Catholicism and that between
200,000-600,000 Serbs died in Croatia, alone. Jozo Tomasevich
notes that Serbs claim between 500,000-700,000 Serbs may have
perished in Croatian cleansing campaigns, but concludes that the
minimum number may have been closer to 350,000. Nor were Serbs
the only victims, as the Germans and their satellites killed
large numbers of anti-Ustasi Croats, Jews and Gypsies who lived
in the Balkans.132 Muslims also suffered considerably. Within
Bosnia-Hercegovina, for instance, roughly 75,000 or 8.1 percent
of the pre-war population perished.133
Precise numbers of Croatian casualties are difficult to
determine, and, while likely less than Serbs, they would still be
considerable. What is known is that at the end of the war
approximately 100,000 Ustasi supporters surrendered to British
authorities. The British, per established procedures, returned
the personnel to Yugoslav (i.e., Tito, thus imparting a
political/military motive) control, where over the course of
roughly six weeks, between 40,000-100,000 (depending upon the
estimate) died.134 Moreover, the civil war did not end in 1945,
and carried on well into 1946. Estimates indicate that as many as
250,000 perished in mass executions, death marches, and
concentration camps during the period.135
Perhaps the greatest consequence of civil war was that,
despite the levels of bloodshed, ethnic issues had not been
resolved. To the people of the Balkans who either lived through
this era or to the current generation who heard, in vivid detail,
grim horror stories from parents or grandparents, these
activities are not history, but life as it exists in the
Hobbesian sense–"solitary, poor, nasty, cruel, brutish, and
short."136 Moreover, many of these people have a face to put on
this misery. A face that belongs to the Croat, Serb, Muslim,
Albanian, or Macedonian who participated in, or who is perceived

as responsible for the crimes of World War II.137 As F. Stephen
Larrabee aptly pointed out, memories run long and deep in the
Balkans.138
Post-war events, particularly the establishment of
totalitarian regimes with an anti-national bent (i.e., Communism)
in much of the Balkans and East-West polarity, generally dampened
ethnic conflict throughout the region. Yugoslavia again provides
an illustrative example of events. In crafting the Constitution
of 1946, Tito attempted to establish internal borders based on
national or historical bases, but the substantial intermingling
of ethnic groups made it impossible to draw lines strictly on
ethnic lines. To compensate for this failing, republic borders
"were defined as sovereign homelands of sovereign nations:
Croatia of Croats, Serbia of Serbs, and so on."139 Obviously
designed to protect ethnic minorities in other republics, this
provision also meant that minorities living within one republic
became part of their respective nation; e.g., Serbs in Croatia
were still part of the Serbian nation.140 Such a proviso could
justify inter-republic interference in the internal affairs of a
neighbor in the name of protecting one's ethnic brethren.
Serbia's actions in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to the present
can be traced directly to this precedent.141
Through a series of constitutional changes (1953, 1962,
1974), Tito attempted to restrain ethnic and nationalist passions
by providing greater local autonomy, the most dramatic instance
being the Constitution of 1974.142 Tito also periodically purged
republic parties that demonstrated too much nationalism, most
notably his purge of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian
branches of the party in 1970-74.143 But Tito only succeeded in
temporarily capping ethnic animosities.
With Tito's passing in 1980, the body politic of Yugoslavia
proved unable to withstand the internal assault of nationalism
and ethnic strife that has engulfed that state. Given the ethnic
groups within the former Yugoslavia that have close ties with
neighboring states, the possibility of the conflict spreading
throughout the Balkans runs high. This potential for expansion is
what the policymakers of today must contend with. But, in
developing their policy options, decisionmakers must understand
the depths of the ethnic animosities that exist within the
Balkans and the second and third order consequences that might
result from policy initiatives.
CULTURE
The linguistic, religious, and ethnic issues outlined above
constitute the fundamental elements of culture,144 and for the
purposes of this report offer a largely complete picture of the
clash of cultures that has taken place (and will likely continue)
in the Balkans. That said, three additional points critical for
decisionmakers' fuller understanding of policy shoals in the
Balkans require explication.

First, policymakers must understand that violence is
ingrained in the cultures of the region. This statement is not
intended as a value judgement, but rather as a recognition of the
influences that have shaped the region. Nor should this result be
surprising: for over two millennia, the Balkans not only has been
the major battleground among competing Greek, Roman, Byzantine,
Ottoman, and Habsburg empires, but also the killing ground for
World War I, World War II, and numerous civil wars.
Second, no one culture dominates the region. The Balkans
contains a melange of Albanian, Greek, Italian, Croatian,
Slovenian, Romanian, Byzantine, Ottoman, Magyar, and Slav
cultures, to name only the major contributors.
Third, the region suffers from a cultural cleavage of
substantial proportions. The reasons for this condition are
manifold and must be understood if policymakers are to make
informed decisions. Populations were first separated along the
border between Rome and Byzantium, which also became the cultural
dividing line between Occident and Orient. Cultural differences
sharpened as a series of conquerors passed through the region and
Magyars, Venetians, Italians, and Germans left their cultural
imprint. But, the key cultural abyss resulted from the clash of
Ottoman and European cultures whose dramatic differences in
government, language, religion, and customs could not have been
any more distinct. As L.S. Stavrianos pointed out, this clash
resulted in:
. . . a cultural dividing line [albeit murky and illdefined, that] runs across the peninsula with Catholic
Christianity, the Latin alphabet, and Western cultural
orientation on one side, and Orthodox Christianity, the
Greek alphabet, and a Byzantine cultural pattern on the
other.145
Finally, the various cultures are exclusive in nature. If an
individual does not display all necessary prerequisites, i.e.,
language, religion, and ethnic origin, he or she is excluded from
membership. Moreover, there appears to be no room for compromise.
Even should an individual speak the language or convert to
another religion, ethnic origin appears to be a distinctive
difference that cannot be overcome.146 Literally, an "us versus
them" cultural mentality exists and, given the rising levels of
violence, is not likely to change in the near future.
The ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina is instructive in
this regard. Bosnia-Hercegovina has largely been a geographicalpolitical expression vice a nation or national identity. Because
Bosnians have been unable to develop either an independent
culture or a culture that conforms to one or the other cultures
in the region, they have been denied entrance into either.
Indeed, the Bosnian state may likely be viewed as antithetical to
the interests of the other competing cultures. The existence of

an independent Bosnia will, therefore, remain problematic as
cultures within the region continue to clash. Undoubtedly, this
condition will vex policymakers as they attempt to craft a
comprehensive settlement to the violence in the former Yugoslavia
or its successor states.
Nor is the situation in former Yugoslavia unique. Similar
divisions afflict other states within the region, (e.g., Romania,
Bulgaria, Greece) and cultural differences will likely continue
to raise temperatures. Whether they will erupt into violence on a
scale equivalent to the wars in the former Yugoslavia may hinge
on how well national leaders and international organizations
learn from the mistakes of the past and craft future policies
that redress age-old societal tensions. The most effective longterm solution to this clash of cultures is the development of
political institutions that will safeguard the minority rights of
the various ethnic and religious groups. Neither the recent nor
distant past offers much hope that such a political solution will
be found quickly, however. The rationale behind this pessimistic
assessment will be explored next.

CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND MISTRUST
Balkan politics–frequent and haphazard changes of
government and general corruption.147
An understanding of the historical factors that have
influenced political outlooks and governmental institutions in
the Balkans is essential to grasping the complexities of current
difficulties within the region. Without a thorough understanding
of the past political development of the region, policymakers may
neither comprehend the complications of the present nor identify
a successful path to the future.
With one or two key exceptions, political developments
within the Balkans tend to follow similar paths. Therefore, the
report will focus first on the legacies of the Ottoman Empire,
and then trace the general political development of the states
within the region from the time they escaped the bonds of empire
to the present day. Finally, the investigation will focus more
sharply on the political development of Yugoslavia.
THE OTTOMAN HERITAGE
At the upper levels of government, the Ottomans established
the precedent of arbitrary, authoritarian, thoroughly repressive,
and violent rule that tightly controlled state policies. If
individuals or regions failed to pay taxes, offer suitable
tribute, or provide sufficient sons to meet the levies for the
Janissaries, retribution came swiftly and violently.148
Contrary to their tight hold at the state level, the Turks
allowed local governments considerable autonomy. After conquering
an area, the Ottomans desired no direct control over their
subject populations and preferred to rule indirectly through
intermediaries.149 Under the millet system, the Turks eliminated
any residual local secular government and replaced it with a
religious authority of local origin, or at least of local
confession, that also had civic responsibilities. Within the
Balkans, this system resulted in the Orthodox Church serving as
the Ottomans' agent for regional and local governments.150
Equally, this led to the Orthodox Church being identified with
the Ottoman state. Thus, when nationalism began to emerge within
the region, non-Orthodox groups saw the Orthodox Church as an
obstacle to their ethnic and nationalist goals.151 Religion,
therefore, tended to reinforce ethnic differences, exacerbating
societal divisions and complicating political development.152
Finally, the Ottomans bequeathed a tradition of corrupt
government. Within the late Ottoman Empire (late 1600s onwards),
office holders viewed their position as a means of amassing
personal wealth as opposed to providing a service to the
governed. At lower governmental levels, wages and salaries were

ridiculously small, encouraging rampant corruption (the concept
of paying baksheesh, for example) to obtain even the most
fundamental services. These traits passed on to succeeding
governments.153
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AFTER OTTOMAN RULE
As states within the Balkans emerged from Ottoman rule, they
tended to follow similar paths. Nationalist awakenings and
repressive Ottoman practices stirred local populations first to
agitation, then to revolt. Initially, insurrectionists did not
achieve full independence, but obtained limited autonomy within
the Ottoman Empire, often under the rule of a local prince.154
To achieve full independence, these states generally
required assistance from an outside power that frequently left
them beholden to their patron, if not under de facto control.155
This dependency resulted in two interesting phenomena. On the one
hand, the requirement to conform to their patron's desires
oftentimes constrained the princes' ability to influence the
international arena. On the other hand, because the princes could
rely on outside support, they did not have to develop stable
internal political institutions and, instead, could rely on
outside support to prop up their regimes.156
Most states evolved into monarchies with strong centralizing
tendencies.157 Although states declared themselves constitutional
monarchies in name and form, monarchy normally prevailed over
constitution, at least through World War II. Political parties,
nonetheless, did come into existence and their rise led to
conflicts between monarchs and emerging political elites. While
these conflicts sometimes curtailed monarchial power, they were
frequently based on regional or ethnic composition that, more
often than not, only further alienated the parties involved.158
World War I provided a watershed for the growth of political
institutions within the Balkans. The Ottoman and Habsburg empires
disappeared, and their territories and nationalities were
distributed among the victorious powers or the states within the
region. The territorial distribution did not, however, satisfy
many of the ethnic-cum-nationalist aspirations in the region.159
The most pressing issue in the immediate post-war period, then,
became how to integrate politically these disgruntled groups.
An increasing number of political parties considerably
complicated this integration process. Because of the manner in
which countries had been cobbled together (or taken apart),
parties in most states spanned the political spectrum:
communists, agrarians, populists, moderates, and rabid
nationalists, few of whom could agree on much of anything.160
Their diversity and political opposition to the increasingly
centralizing nature of the monarchies caused them to fragment,
leading, in turn, to increased weakness of the parliamentary
factions.161

More importantly, perhaps, this political fragmentation
resulted in an inability to resolve the vast problems left over
from before World War I, as well as the dilemmas generated by the
war and the peace that followed. In short, throughout the
Balkans, political parties failed to govern effectively. As a
result, internal political instability and economic crisis led to
the demise of democratic government.162
The economic disasters of the Great Depression brought
matters to a head. Throughout the region, right wing,
authoritarian dictatorships stepped in to end ethnic violence,
political instability, and economic crisis. The facade of
democracy might have been maintained, but the dictators ruled
with a strong hand, effectively emasculating any opposition.163
The events leading up to World War II, particularly the rise of
fascism, only further contributed to the accretion of dictatorial
power within the region.
The German conquest of the Balkans clamped the region ever
more firmly in the grip of authoritarian regimes. The occupied
countries of Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia suffered varying
degrees of harsh occupation. Bulgaria and Romania initially
enjoyed considerable freedom from German interference, but the
exigencies of war inevitably led to a tightening of the
dictatorial grips of their rulers.
The end of World War II brought mixed results for the
political development of the region. In Romania, Bulgaria,
Albania, and Yugoslavia, Communist governments established a
dictatorial hold that exceeded that of the right wing dictators.
While Tito's variant of communism may have been considerably more
gentle than that of nearby Stalinist clones, Yugoslavia was still
Communist. As Barbara Jelavich noted, the establishment of
Communist regimes in the Balkans created a political dividing
line in the bipolar world that reinforced existing cultural,
religious, and linguistic divisions164 and would not be breached
for over 40 years.
Nor did Greece and Turkey easily escape from the clutches of
authoritarianism. Greece fought a brutal civil war against a
Communist insurrection from 1944-49. After conclusion of the
civil war, a relatively stable and democratic government emerged
that would last for nearly two decades. By the mid-1960s, Greek
politics began to fragment, primarily over the failed union with
Cyprus and the rapid rise of Andreas Papandreou.165 With the
emergence of a dysfunctional government, the Greek Army once
again took matters into its own hands and for 7 years Greece
lived under a harsh military dictatorship. Greece returned to a
democratically elected government in 1974 and has subsequently
maintained a stable and open political system.166
After World War II, Turkey followed a regular cycle of
civilian government, increasing political polarization,

decreasing ability to govern, rising radical violence, and
military intervention that led to a series of coups in 1960,
1971, and 1980.167 In all cases, military leaders stated their aim
to restore civil peace and prepare the country for the rapid
reintroduction of civil government under the rule of law. In each
instance, the military yielded power to civil authorities as
promised.168 These actions did not, however, entirely remove the
specter of future military intervention which still hangs over
Turkey.169 While Turkey has made tremendous strides in this
century, it continues to struggle toward full democracy.170
THE YUGOSLAV EXAMPLE
The rationale behind a sharper focus on Yugoslavia is
several-fold. First, Yugoslavia represents a microcosm of the
various general trends of the region. Second, Yugoslavia
(initially in the form of an autonomous and then an independent
Serbia) arrived first on the international stage and set
precedents for others to follow. Third, the Serbian nationalist
drive throughout the 19th century exerted tremendous influence
over the political development of other emerging states within
the region. Finally, the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia
are, in many ways, an extension of the long historical battle
between the political concepts of a highly centralized "Greater
Serbia" and a loose federal union of South Slavs. An examination
of Yugoslavia's political development may shed light on the
efficacy of potential solutions to the current crisis.
The origins of the modern Yugoslav state can be traced to
1804, when Djordje Petrovic (Karadjordje or "Black George") led a
decade-long revolt against oppressive Janissary rule in Serbia.
Initially successful, the movement captured Belgrade and
liberated large portions of Serbia, but lost momentum after
Russia failed to provide promised support and the Ottomans awoke
to the threat. Forced to flee to the Austrian Empire in 1813,
Karadjordje could still claim considerable success in mobilizing
Serbian nationalism. Moreover, he left behind a legacy of limited
Serbian autonomy under his personal rule, as well as a large
number of trained and motivated supporters who would bide their
time until the next revolt.171
The next rebellion was not long in coming, for in 1817 Milos
Obrenovic, one of Karadjordje's rivals, led another, more
successful revolt. The circumstances surrounding it are quite
interesting. In return for helping the Ottomans put down a local
revolt in 1814, the Porte named Obrenovic supreme prince of
Serbia and granted him limited autonomy in the collection of
taxes and the conduct of local government.172
Milos received the right of personal, not hereditary rule.
Dissatisfied with these circumstances, he commenced a long
campaign to expand Serbian borders, increase his authority, and
establish his own hereditary line, which he declared in 1817. In
one of his first acts to cement his rule, Milos had Karadjordje

(who had returned in the wake of Milos' success) beheaded,
supposedly in retaliation for the suspected poisoning of Milos'
half-brother. This event set in motion the long political and
blood feud between the Karadjordjevic and Obrenovic families.173
Largely because of Russian intercession on Milos' behalf and
Turkey's defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, the Ottomans
granted Serbia full autonomy in 1830 and Milos received the right
of hereditary rule. Under the terms of the Porte's agreement,
Milos shared power with the Skupstina, an assembly of notables
whom he attempted–with some success–to eliminate one by one.
Milos' arbitrary, violent, and corrupt rule precipitated numerous
revolts and, finally, outside intervention in 1838 that resulted
in a new constitution. Milos refused to cooperate with the
Serbian oligarchy as stipulated in the constitution and abdicated
in favor of his son, Milan.174
Figure 3 summarizes the confusing succession to the Serbian
throne throughout the 19th century. It also can be used to derive
insights into the political development of Serbia from Milos'
abdication through the assassination of Alexander Obrenovic
(1903). First, the figure reflects the bitter political rivalry
between the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevic families that would
debilitate Serbian politics for nearly a century. Second, it
provides an indication of the long struggle between the Skupstina
and either very weak or capricious authoritarian rulers who were
forced to abdicate. Third, the figure reveals a predilection
toward violence as the means of political change. What it does
not indicate, but which is also important for an understanding of
political developments, is the tradition of corrupt and
repressive government that resulted from the continuous
political instability during this period.
Shortly after Alexander Obrenovic's assassination, the
Skupstina elected Peter Karadjordjevic, then age 60, to the
throne. Peter I returned from 45 years exile and immediately
revitalized Serbia. Internally, Peter ruled as a constitutional
monarch in close cooperation with a Skupstina controlled by the
Radicals, predominantly under the leadership of Nikola Pasic.
From 1903 to the outbreak of World War I, Serbia enjoyed a period
of relative calm and prosperity that saw the country make
tremendous strides in civil liberties, economics, education, and
national prestige.175
After Peter's accession, Serbian foreign policies became
decidedly nationalistic and anti-Austrian. The Austrians
exacerbated conditions through the so-called "Pig War" (a tariff
war in 1906 designed to halt Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement) and
the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, two traditionally South
Slav provinces, in 1908. After the Bosnian crisis (1908),
Serbian-Austrian relations had reached the point of no return.176
Denied access to the Adriatic Sea by the Austrian annexation
of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Serbs turned their attention to the
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of Rule
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1804-1813

Karadjordje

Defeated by Turks.
beheaded by Milos
Obrenovic.

1817-1839
(first reign)

Milos Obrenovic

Forced to abdicate.

1839

Milan Obrenovic

Died from disease.

1839-1842
(first reign)

Michael Obrenovic

Forced to abdicate.

1842-1858

Alexander
Karadjordjevic

Forced to abdicate.

1858-1860
(second reign)

Milos Obrenovic

Died of natural causes.

1839-1842
(second reign)

Michael Obrenovic

Assassinated by
Karadjordjevic faction?

1868-1889

Milan II Obrenovic

Forced to abdicate.

1889-1903

Alexander Obrenovic

Assassinated by Army
officers.

1903-1921

Peter I
Karadjordjevic

Senile from 1914. Died
of natural causes.

1921-1934
(regent 1914)

Alexander
Karadjordjevic

Assassinated by
Macedonian terrorist.

1934-1945

Peter II
Karadjordjevic

Prince Recent Paul
Karadjordjevic overthrown
by a military coup, 1941.
Monarchy abolished, 1945.

Figure 3.
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Rulers of Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1804-1945.

Source: William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, 5th
ed., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972, p. 760.

southeast. Here Peter I helped construct the Balkan League which
first successfully dismembered much of the European portion of
the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War (1912), and later
stopped Bulgarian aggression in the Second Balkan War (1913).
Three key results emerged from these successes. First, Serbia
nearly doubled in size. Second, the Serbian victories electrified
Slavs under Austrian domination who began to look to Belgrade for
salvation.177 Third, the combination of these circumstances set
Serbia and Austria on a collision course that culminated shortly
thereafter in Sarajevo, where Gavrilo Princip (a Bosnian Serb
working for the Serbian society Union or Death, better known as
the Black Hand) assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria
and lit the powder trail that exploded into World War I.
The major events of World War I are too well-known to be
repeated here. But it is important to understand the levels of
Croat-Serb mistrust generated during the war. First, of the South
Slav states, Serbia suffered the brunt of the casualties of the
war.178 Second, many Croats fought for the Habsburgs.179 Third,
under the terms of the secret Treaty of London (1915) that
brought Italy into the war against Austria-Hungary, the allies
granted much ethnically Croat and Slovene territory to Italy.
Well-founded rumors circulated that Serbian Premier Pasic would
acquiesce to the agreement so long as Serbia gained territory
populated by Serbs or Orthodox followers, as well as access to
the Adriatic.180
By the summer of 1917, however, the various nationalities
felt compelled to reach some form of agreement on the future of
the South Slav peoples. The Habsburgs and their allies had driven
the Serbian Army and government into exile on the island of
Corfu. Isolated, knowing the terms of the Treaty of London, and
in need of allies, the Serbs pursued negotiations with the
Yugoslav Committee on the formation of a South Slav state.181
Croats and Slovenes realized that, individually, each was too
weak to withstand the Habsburgs or Italians. An alliance with
Serbia within the construct of a Yugoslav state offered the only
viable alternative and they, too, sought the good offices of the
Yugoslav Committee.182
This convergence of interests resulted in the Corfu
Declaration of July 1917, where the Serbian government and the
Yugoslav Committee agreed to the creation of a Yugoslav state as
a constitutional monarchy under the Karadjordjevic dynasty.183
While perhaps not a "shotgun" marriage, the agreement certainly
represented a marriage of convenience. On the one hand, the Serbs
compromised because they needed allies and U.S. approval, but
looked to establish a "Greater Serbia" that included all Serbs
whose land would be dominated by Belgrade. On the other hand, the
remaining ethnic groups, particularly Croats (who wanted a
Croatian state, but realized some form of autonomy within a
confederation was the only practical option), feared a Serbiandominated state and wanted a loose confederation that would grant

relative autonomy to the various elements of the South Slav
state.184 These attitudes undoubtedly sowed the seeds of future
estrangement, and, it is worth pointing out, much of the impetus
behind the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia stems from
this very point: perceived Serb domination versus independence
and autonomy.
Despite these misgivings, the new state took life in the
waning days of World War I. On October 29, 1918, the National
Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs meeting in Croatia
announced the founding of the "State of Slovenes, Croats, and
Serbs." Less than one month later (November 24) the Kingdoms of
Montenegro and Serbia merged with the new state. Shortly
thereafter, the National Council's delegates in Belgrade opted to
accept the Karadjordjevic dynasty as ruler of a joint state.
Thus, the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs merged with Serbia
and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes emerged on the
world scene on December 1, 1918, with Prince Alexander
Karadjordjevic of Serbia as king.185 Little noticed at the time,
however, Stephen Radic, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party and
who would rapidly emerge as the dominant Croatian leader, refused
to sign the agreements, and instead called for an independent
Croatia.186
Political developments in the inter-war era generally can be
divided into three periods. Almost immediately, disputes arose
over the question of centralism versus federalism. Put simply,
the Serb view of centralization triumphed and Belgrade dominated
the government of the new state.187 These circumstances created
considerable tensions between the Serb-dominated government and
the increasingly frustrated Croats, as well as Muslims, who,
having fought for centuries to achieve their freedom, felt
cheated of even the autonomy they had enjoyed under the
Habsburgs.188 But the Croats proved unable to unite sufficient
opposition to Serb centralizing policies. Moreover, the Serbdominated government suppressed opposition parties, initiated
repressive measures, and labelled any criticism of the government
or constitution (which, of course, legitimized Serb domination)
as treason.189 The combination of repressive measures, obvious
election chicanery, and unfulfilled Croatian expectations only
heightened animosity that would continue to grow throughout the
1920s. Political tensions gradually increased to a fever pitch
until June 1928 when a Montenegrin delegate opened fire on the
Croatian Peasant Party delegation in the Skupstina, killing two
delegates (one of whom was Radic's nephew) and wounding three,
including Stephen Radic, who died a few weeks later.190
Not surprisingly, Croats reacted violently to Radic's death,
demanded a free Croatia, and the Peasant Party once again
boycotted the Skupstina. Vladko Macek, Radic's successor, met
with King Alexander in January 1929 and demanded a new
constitution based on federal principles that would grant Croatia
nearly complete internal autonomy (government, military,
economic, currency, etc.). When Serbian members of the government

refused to accept Croatian demands, Alexander abolished the 1921
constitution, dissolved the Skupstina, suppressed all political
parties, and established his personal dictatorship.191
Alexander's dictatorship ended in true Yugoslav political
tradition with his murder in Marseilles in October 1934.
Ominously, Italian and Hungarian authorities had aided and
abetted his Macedonian assassin. More importantly for Yugoslav
political developments, the Croatian nationalist group, Ustasa,
also assisted in the assassination.192
Alexander's death briefly united the country, but the
opportunity for conciliation quickly passed. The new king, Peter
II, was only 11 years old at the time of his father's death and,
therefore, a three man regency council headed by his uncle,
Prince Paul, guided the government. Prince Paul held genuinely
liberal views, but given the tense political situation and his
own tenuous hold on the regency, he moved slowly. Conditions did
improve as Prince Paul lifted press restrictions and eliminated
many repressive practices. He also granted a general amnesty and
held new elections to the Skupstina in 1935. Despite a bare
plurality, stacked electoral laws gave the Serbs and their
parliamentary allies two thirds of the seats. As a result, the
Croats, once again under Macek's leadership, refused to
participate in the Skupstina, governmental deadlock continued,
and nationalist tensions rose.193
The government remained split until August 1939 when most
parties finally recognized the rising threats from Germany and
Italy. After 6 months of negotiations with Prince Paul, Macek
turned his back on his old opposition allies and signed an
agreement (Sporazum [Understanding], August 1939) that, if fully
implemented, would have granted significant internal Croatian
autonomy. Macek also became one of two Yugoslav vice-premiers.194
Importantly for present conditions in the former Yugoslavia, the
agreement also joined Croatia, Dalmatia, and seven largely
Croatian districts in Bosnia-Hercegovina into one administrative
unit.195 With this agreement, internal politics largely stagnated,
as the government focused more and more on the course of World
War II.
The German invasion of Yugoslavia temporarily, at least,
resolved the issue of centralism versus federalism as the Germans
and Italians dismembered the country. After dividing the spoils
among themselves, the Axis Powers and their allies left only a
rump Croatia and Serbia. And, while Croatia enjoyed relative
autonomy under the control of Ante Pavelic' and his Ustasi,
Serbia remained under the tight control of German occupation
forces. This control became ever tighter as the Partisan and
Chetnik uprisings began.
The resulting Yugoslav civil war needs no further
elaboration beyond one key observation: the intense frustrations
and hatreds that had simmered since the inception of Yugoslavia

boiled over from 1941-45. Serb fought Croat, Communist fought
Royalist, Chetnik fought Ustasa, and Catholic fought Orthodox,
while both fought Muslim. That tempest of blood which plagued
post-World War II political developments continues to this very
day.196
By the end of World War II, Tito's Partisans had won the
civil war and firmly controlled Yugoslavia. In November 1945, the
Anti-Fascist Council held national elections that,
unsurprisingly, voted overwhelmingly for the official list of
candidates and Tito's Communists cemented their control over the
country. Shortly thereafter, a constitutional assembly met,
disbanded the monarchy, and began drafting a new constitution. In
crafting this document, Tito attempted to devise a political
settlement that would preclude the ethnic and resultant political
tensions that had plagued Yugoslavia in the inter-war era and
spilled so much Yugoslav blood during the war.197
The new constitution clearly established a federal basis for
the state, which was divided into six republics: BosniaHercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia. Within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo hypothetically
enjoyed autonomous status. The constitution recognized four major
languages (Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, and Slovenian) and
Hungarians and Albanians could speak their native tongues in
their respective autonomous areas. Theoretically, the state
remained responsible only for finance, economic planning, foreign
policy, defense, communications and legal matters. The republics
would retain all other government functions.198
Reality proved much different, however. As in the early
years of the state, Belgrade maintained tight control over all
aspects of Yugoslav society (although the basis was different–
Communism, not nationalism). As Tito broke from the Stalinist
Bloc (from 1948), centralized control relaxed somewhat and the
republics assumed greater influence over their internal affairs
throughout the 1950s, and over the federal government under the
constitution of 1953.199 Conditions continued to improve when Tito
promulgated a new constitution in 1963 that further decentralized
government and established considerable legislative independence
at the republic level.200
Despite the considerable gains made in establishing
republican autonomy from the central government in Belgrade,
Croatia and Slovenia ceaselessly demanded and received greater
decentralization. Moreover, as Barbara Jelavich points out,
discussions took on an increasingly nationalistic tone, as
republics once again aired old grievances against Belgrade's
(i.e., Serbian) centralization.201 By 1971, according to some
observers, Yugoslavia verged on disintegration and only Tito's
prestige held the country together.202
Tito acted quickly to stave off further fragmentation.
First, he severely purged the Croatian branch of the party and

removed the separatist factions. Second, in 1974, he proclaimed a
new constitution designed to appease republic demands for
increased autonomy. In the first instance, his actions may have
bought time, but he succeeded only in further alienating Croatian
nationalists who resented the reinstitution of centralized
control of the party from Belgrade.203 In the second instance, the
increased autonomy granted under the new constitution only
accelerated centrifugal forces already at work within Yugoslavia.
And, while Tito could keep the lid on because of his immense
personal prestige, he would not live forever and, eventually,
these cracks could no longer be papered over.204
Tito's death in 1980 set in motion the slow, painful demise
of Yugoslavia. In a gradual process, republic leaders
increasingly focused on local and republic issues at the expense
of the state as a whole. According to Sabrina Petra Ramet's
article in Foreign Affairs, the unravelling of Yugoslavia began
in April 1981 when ethnic Albanians in Kosovo rioted to protest
their economic straits and demonstrations took on an anti-Serb
tone. As rumors spread of supposed Albanian atrocities, Serbian
nationalism steadily grew until March 1986 when the Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences declared Serbs to be the oppressed
minority in Yugoslavia.205
At this point, Slobodan Milosevic entered the Serbian
political scene. Milosevic professed a simple platform:
unrestrained Serbian nationalism that sought to overturn the
existing system and restore Serbs and Serbia to their "rightful
place." Within 2 years, Milosevic seized control of the Serbian
Communist Party organization, eliminated his rivals within
Serbia, and gained support of the Yugoslav Army.206 In short
order, Milosevic then brought down the governments of Kosovo,
Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and replaced them with loyal
supporters. Then, in February 1989, Milosevic succeeded in
eliminating the constitutional provisions guaranteeing autonomy
to Kosovo and Vojvodina and reincorporated them into Serbia.207
These events obviously had considerable consequences for
Yugoslavia. As Yugoslav commentator Branka Magas pointed out,
eventual Federal sanction of Milosevic's actions legitimized
Serbian nationalism, as well as the use of extra-parliamentary
action and violence to attain that goal. Because of the violent
Kosovar reaction to the loss of their freedom, the Federal
Yugoslav Army occupied Kosovo in 1990, establishing the precedent
of using the army against a fellow Federal member. Serbia kept
the votes of Vojvodina and Kosovo within the collective Federal
Presidency, providing Serbia with a disproportionate influence in
that body.208
These events produced anxiety throughout Yugoslavia, as the
other republics feared Milosevic's centralizing tendencies.209
Indeed, there was legitimate reason for concern. Throughout 1989,
Serbian nationalists argued that the internal republic boundaries
artificially divided the Serb nation, and that Serbia reserved

the right to speak for all Serbs, not just those living within
Serbia.210
By autumn 1989, matters worsened when Slovenia instituted a
series of internal constitutional reforms, the most important
being the right to secede from the Federal state, the exclusive
right to declare a state of emergency (to forestall actions
similar to Milosevic's in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro), and
the exclusive right to authorize the presence or use of the
Yugoslav military in Slovenia.211
By the end of 1990, the disintegration of Yugoslavia
accelerated. With the exception of Kosovo (under military
occupation), republics held elections that resulted in nonCommunist governments in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and
Slovenia, and a Communist-controlled minority coalition in
Macedonia. Moreover, Croatia and Slovenia expressed interest in
coordinating their defense and security policies, which smacked
of a mutual defense pact against Serbia.212
None of these republics had any desire to accede to
Milosevic's demands for increased centralization. The leaders of
the six republics held a series of meetings intended to find a
way out of the impasse between Serbian demands for centralization
and equally strident demands (predominantly from Croatia and
Slovenia) for increased decentralization. When Milosevic showed
no signs of yielding his strong nationalist position, Croatia and
Slovenia declared that if a new inter-republican agreement had
not been reached by June 26, 1991, they would leave the
federation.213 Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist on June 27,
1991, when "Yugoslav Army" tanks invaded independent Slovenia.
Over 4 years of internal war in the former Yugoslavia
represents a continuation of centuries-old nationalism: Croatian
ultranationalists, the quest for a "Greater Serbia," and the
refusal of one or more ethnic groups to live under the political
control of another ethnic group. Despite recent international
interventions,214 no end of the civil war is in sight. Moreover,
internal political difficulties within Serbia (i.e., Kosovo and
Vojvodina) portend further conflict that may exceed the current
scale of violence.
Nor is the Yugoslav example dramatically different from
other states within the Balkans. Indeed, through the end of World
War II, political developments in much of the region closely
paralleled those of Yugoslavia as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania
succumbed to totalitarian communism that stifled their political
development for more than 40 years. Recent events in the Balkans,
however, offer a more positive, but still spotty, picture of
political development. Greece has demonstrated considerable
dedication to democratic ideals since the Colonels' Revolt of
1967 and the return to democratic institutions in 1974. Despite
repeated military intervention and the ongoing PKK revolt, Turkey
appears to be on a solid path toward increased democratic reform.

Revolutions in former Communist states also offer a ray of
hope for further evolution of democratic institutions within the
Balkans. But developments may be more problematic in these
states, as nascent and fragile freedoms face considerable
internal, as well as external, instability that threatens the
growth of democracy. Despite executing Ceausescu, for example,
Romania appears merely to have changed the name of the ruling
party apparatus. Albania struggles with immense economic
difficulties, a potential war with Serbia over Kosovo, and a
total absence of any democratic history or institutions. And,
while Bulgaria offers the most positive example, the final vote
on democracy is still not in.
The general historical development of political institutions
in the Balkans offers little optimism for dramatic improvement in
political conditions. Indeed, the course of historical
development is more a study of instability, authoritarianism, and
violence. To overcome this tragic history, Balkan leaders will
have to break from their past and establish dramatically new
political patterns. This may require considerable time,
resources, and effort on the part not only of the Balkan states,
but of the remainder of Europe and the United States, as well.
Only the test of time will determine whether the Balkans, as a
whole, can overcome its political heritage and establish lasting
political systems based on democratic tenets. At this point,
expectations should not be raised too high.

CHAPTER 5
INSIGHTS TO ASSIST INFORMED DECISIONMAKING
The problem is learning how to govern over diversity:
Ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic diversity.
–former Secretary of State
George Shultz215
As stated in the introductory section, the primary intent of
this monograph is not to argue for or against military
intervention in the Balkans, or, specifically, Yugoslavia. Nor
has the purpose of this historical examination been simply to
chronicle the woes of the region. The intent, thus far, has been
to provide policymakers with an understanding of the depths of
the issues, to offer insights into the perceptions of the
participants, and to offer greater comprehension of the root
causes of conflicts, which will allow policymakers to make
informed decisions on potential policy choices.
The preceding discussion paints a rather complex landscape
that policymakers must decipher if they are successfully to grasp
the nettle of the Balkans. As they grapple for solutions to the
multiple and seemingly intractable conflicts, policymakers must
acknowledge this complexity and craft comprehensive solutions. To
do so, they must think in a broader context that weaves the
variegated strands of the Balkans into a coherent tapestry. They
must identify, examine, and connect an array of disparate and
incredibly complex individual issues (e.g., language, religion,
ethnic origin, and culture) in a manner that produces an accurate
and coherent articulation of the problems. Without such an
understanding, policymakers may not fully comprehend the
consequences of their decisions. To this end, the general
conclusions outlined below offer some insights that may prove
useful in developing policy.

In the Balkans, the past–no matter how distant it may appear
to Americans–is inextricably entwined with the present and
extends into the future. Analysts must understand this history,
and the local perceptions that enshroud it. Balkan history is not
the collective record of the region, but the fragmented story of
competing religious groups, ethnic tribes, nationalist movements,
and internal political factions, each of which bears an
historical grudge or claim against one or more groups. The recent
history of the last 4 years has reinforced these long-standing
animosities. This is not to argue that a history of conflict will
lead inexorably to future violence in the region, but those who
dismiss such historical rancor as anachronistic or irrational
seriously underestimate the influence of the distant and recent
past on the present and the future.
Cultural cleavages–whether within the Balkans or between
Balkan and U.S. leaders–are wider than many analysts comprehend.

Although impolitic to say, substantial dissimilarities exist
between U.S. and Balkan cultures and mind sets (e.g., values,
ethics, logic patterns). Furthermore, markedly different
civilizations meet in the Balkans, particularly in BosniaHercegovina, where religious and ethnic frictions exacerbate the
clash of cultures. Above all, American decisionmakers must
understand that–whether at the individual, national, or
international level–violence has been an accepted vehicle of
change for over 2 millennia and undoubtedly will continue to be
so.

Analysts and policymakers, therefore, should not assume that
Balkan politicians follow Western European or American logic.
This is not to imply that Balkan leaders are irrational, but to
point out that they have different historical bases and values
that may drive an entirely different thought process. What may
look irrational to a Western interlocutor may be absolutely
credible in the eyes of a Balkan leader or his followers.
American decisionmakers must understand that such dichotomies
will occur and, rather than dismiss them out of hand, learn to
bridge the gap between Balkan and Western logic.
U.S. and Western European analysts also must be careful not
to mirror image their own values onto Balkan political leaders. A
misguided assumption of common values could lead to a fundamental
misunderstanding of an interlocutor's negotiating position or
room for political maneuver. For example, many Balkan politicians
(e.g., Karadzic of the so-called Republica Srpska or Milosevic of
Serbia) have painted themselves into a corner because their
rhetoric has stirred up a whirlwind of passion from which they
may not be able to disengage, let alone control.
Ethnic identity is sine qua non to individuals in the
Balkans, especially to the participants in the ongoing wars in
the former Yugoslavia–so important that many are willing to kill
or die for it. Policymakers must remain aware that the conflict
is largely rooted in the fact that no one ethnic group was, or
is, willing to live under the political control of another ethnic
group. An "us versus them" situation offers little room for
compromise. Potential solutions to the conflict must take these
realities into account.
One should not minimize the depths of religious animosity in
the Balkans. This statement is more than a truism. Western
analysts must comprehend the importance of the religious
component of ethnic identity to the inhabitants of the Balkans.
Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic and Serbs are Orthodox;
they have been in conflict since the "Great Schism" of 1054 and
show no sign of compromising. Equally important, both groups
consider Bosnian and ethnic Albanian Muslims apostate Serbs (or
Croats) who expediently converted to Islam and should be returned
to the fold–by force, if necessary. At the same time, events of
the past 4 years have introduced a stronger faith among the once
largely nominal Muslim population. Thus, the religious overtones

of the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia–to include the
broader influences of the Islamic world–cannot be ignored.

The patchwork quilt of ethnic groups in the Balkans
complicates conflict resolution more than many understand.
Despite 4 years of ethnic cleansing and massive population
displacement, ethnically heterogeneous or "pure" territories or
states will not exist. Ethnic groups will still live in close
proximity to recent adversaries, complicating the ability to
achieve lasting peace. Indeed, animosities developed over
centuries, and reinforced by the events of the last 4 years, will
not be resolved quickly. Short-term expedients to bring peace to
the region may only worsen conditions, setting the stage for a
future explosion.
Compromise represents weakness, particularly to politicians
who think only in zero-sum game terms, and where in the past,
defeat has frequently meant death. Moreover, compromise is
difficult when matters of principle are involved on such major
issues as historical rights, territorial boundaries, national
states, and sovereignty, much less on ethnic, religious, and
cultural beliefs. Negotiators must be prepared for difficult and
protracted dialogue. Progress will occur only in an incremental
and discontinuous manner. Backsliding can be expected. Diplomats
and leaders, therefore, must display considerable patience and be
prepared for a painfully slow process.
The ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia stem from multiple
causes: fervent nationalism that springs from artificially
heightened ethnic identity (religion, language, and an ethnic
group's shared history, myths, and culture), economic
disparities, regional differences, urban versus rural cultures,
and preferred governmental structures, to name only the most
prominent. Thus, solutions to the wars in the former Yugoslavia
must address not simply one issue, but a large number of complex,
interactive problems that exponentially increase the difficulties
inherent in achieving a settlement. As a result, policymakers and
interlocutors must be aware of the potential for short-term
negotiating expedients to jeopardize long-term solutions to the
conflict.
Not one war, but a melange of wars is currently being waged
within the former Yugoslavia. Elements of interstate aggression
(e.g., initial Yugoslav National Army actions in Slovenia and
Croatia (1991), continued Serbian Army support for ethnic Bosnian
and Croatian Serbs), civil/ethnic war (e.g., ethnic Croats,
Muslims, and ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina), religious
conflict between Muslims and Christians, limited war (United
States and NATO approach) versus total war (i.e., wars of
survival for the various ethnic groups), personal power (e.g.,
Abdic, Karadzic, and Milosevic), and psychopaths who simply enjoy
the killing all exist within the conflict raging in the Balkans.
Therefore, in developing potential solutions, policymakers must
pursue options that, at best, address as many of these individual

conflicts as possible. At the least, negotiators must not pursue
resolution of one factor at the expense of others, for doing so
may only exacerbate another element, prolonging war in the
region.

Existing political institutions in the Balkans are not
likely to contribute to the peaceful resolution of tensions, as
the political development of the region is but a long history of
instability and violence. From the Byzantine Empire through the
1980s, corrupt and repressive governments have been the norm. The
region largely lacks the precedent of the peaceful transfer of
power. Large segments of the population see democracy as an
institution of chaos. Ethnic minorities currently have no
historical basis–long-term or proximate–to believe that political
institutions will protect their lives, much less their political
rights. Four years of war have hardened nationalist positions,
exacerbating these forces and shrinking political maneuvering
room.
POTENTIAL LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS
As former Secretary of State George Schultz has pointed out,
the basic problem to be overcome in the Balkans "... is learning
how to govern over diversity: Ethnic, cultural, religious,
linguistic diversity."216 Under the best of conditions, diversity
alone poses significant challenges to finding tolerable
solutions. But the history of the region, particularly recent
history, exponentially complicates the ability of leaders to
devise acceptable ones. Thus, the search for solutions to
problems in the region will be protracted and difficult.

Only a fundamental break from the past–distant, as well as
recent–offers the possibility of a viable long-term solution.
Forging a new path will be difficult, however, for the people of
the Balkans hold their history close to their hearts. If longterm solutions are to succeed, a thorough reform of political
systems and institutions must occur. Long-term progress will be
possible only if governments can instill sufficient confidence in
their populations to overcome the profound mistrust and deep
animosity that have developed over the centuries, and have been
violently reinforced over the past 4 years. Ethnic and religious
minorities will have to be convinced that governments will
safeguard their interests. Nationalist and irredentist demands,
particularly an expansionist Croatia or the long drive for a
"Greater Serbia," will have to be contained. At the same time,
the oftentimes legitimate fears of ethnic Serbs in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Macedonia, and Croatia of living under the political
control of another ethnic group will have to be acknowledged and
addressed.217 All of these matters are much easier said than done.
To effect a break from the past, the United States and
Europe will have to invest considerable long-term economic,
political, intellectual, and military capital to support the
development of democratic institutions within the region. The

European Union (EU) represents an important mechanism in this
regard. The prospect of substantial EU reconstruction funds
offers a powerful incentive for belligerents to reach an
agreement. Similarly, membership in the EU–and the future
economic development it entails–will not be offered until the
parties conform to EU standards of conduct. In other words, those
nations seeking EU membership will have to learn to settle their
differences through negotiation–not through violence. Finally,
should states within the former Yugoslavia become EU members, the
penalties for operating outside the norms of the European
community can be significant, thereby exercising a dampening
factor on any future conflicts.218 All of this presumes, of
course, that the EU and its members are willing to devote the
time, money, and effort that will be required to see these
initiatives through to fruition.
Given the past history of the Balkans and the current
ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, this course will prove
daunting. The level of political, economic, and intellectual
commitment needed, however, cannot be forecast with any accuracy–
but it will be considerable. Governments must begin now to lay
the groundwork with publics and parliaments for the level and
duration of commitment that may be required.

Events in the Balkan crisis have demonstrated that U.S.
leadership in Europe is essential to
secure U.S. national
interests in the region and Europe.219 This will require a level
of engagement in Europe and in European security organizations
larger than U.S. political leaders have previously anticipated.
Such a degree of involvement will also require U.S. political
leaders to explain to the American public the interests involved,
and why such a commitment of U.S. capital–time, prestige, fiscal
resources–is necessary to sustain those interests.
Diplomatic actions, alone, are not likely to bring about a
settlement, and military power will be required to establish
conditions suitable to build a lasting peace settlement.
Diplomatic initiatives, political pressure, and economic
embargoes and sanctions have not yet yielded success. Granted,
such options take time and economic sanctions appear to be having
an effect on Serbia and Montenegro, but these efforts alone have
not brought an end to the conflict and forced a political
settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Conversely, Croatian and
Bosnian military successes of recent months, coupled with a firm
display of NATO political will and military airpower, have
redressed the strategic balance in the region and brought the
parties to the negotiating table in earnest. To be sure,
diplomatic and economic initiatives laid the groundwork and set
the stage for successful application of military power, but
military power is the decisive catalyst that brought all parties
to a potential solution.220
Should U.S. political leaders decide to commit ground troops
in Bosnia-Hercegovina, they will have to convince the American

public and Congress that it is in U.S. national interests to make
the size of investments–intellectual, political, economic, and
military–required to achieve an acceptable solution in the
Balkans. This effort will prove to be no easy task if the United
States becomes increasingly preoccupied with its own domestic
difficulties. But, without such a level and duration of
commitment, acceptable solutions may not be found.
Substantial time–perhaps decades or generations–will be
necessary to build and sustain the political ethos,
organizations, and governmental structures needed for a lasting
solution in the Balkans. Problems that developed over centuries
cannot be transformed overnight. This is not to argue that longterm solutions are not possible, but only to point out the
difficulties involved. The post-World War II Franco-German
model221 offers hope, but even that case indicates the time,
effort, and leadership dedicated to good will on all sides that
are necessary. Such examples are absent from the historical
political landscape of the former Yugoslavia. And, the events of
the last 4 years are unlikely to generate favorable conditions or
leaders capable of dramatic policy reversals.
These insights are not intended to provide an overly
pessimistic portrait of the difficulties inherent in resolving
the crisis in the Balkans. They do, however, illuminate the root
causes of the ongoing conflict, reflect the perceptions of Balkan
leaders, and provide a fuller context for policymakers as they
deliberate U.S. policy. Leaders, however, not only must recognize
these insights, they must assimilate and factor them into their
decisionmaking calculus as they assess policy options for the
Balkans. It is to this issue that the discussion next turns.

CHAPTER 6
NO EASY CHOICES:
ASSESSING SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONS
All that is required for evil to flourish is that good
men do nothing.
–Edmund Burke222
The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an
outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation;
it is to shape real events in a real world.
–John F. Kennedy223
In the 2-plus years since the original version of this
monograph was published, U.S. policymakers have struggled with
the fundamental dilemma reflected in the two quotes cited above
as they labored to identify U.S. national interests in the
region,224 defined policy objectives, and delimited options to
effect those goals. As a result of those efforts, the United
States also has outlined specific policy objectives for resolving
the wars in the former Yugoslavia:
• A political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the
country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for
all its peoples;
• Preventing the spread of fighting into a broader Balkan
war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new
democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;
• Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the
conflict;
• Halting the slaughter of innocents; and,
• Helping to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War
Europe while maintaining the U.S. role in shaping Europe's
security architecture.225
Equally important for understanding the formulation and execution
of U.S. policy in the Balkans, the United States has avoided
deploying ground forces to the region except under certain, very
circumscribed conditions. Indeed, avoiding ground commitments,
especially combat troops, has been a de facto goal.226 Whether
these oftentimes conflicting goals can all be achieved is open to
question.227
To fulfill U.S. objectives and ensure U.S. national
interests in the region, policymakers have a broad range of
options from which to choose. As they weigh possible
alternatives, decisionmakers should keep several points in mind.

First, while the options are presented and assessed separately,
none of them are individually capable of redressing the multiple
causes of the conflict in the Balkans. Second, several of the
options could and should be used concurrently, in a complementary
and reinforcing manner. In doing so, policymakers must ensure
that conflicting or contradictory options are not pursued
simultaneously. Finally, political leaders must ensure that
expedients to achieve short-range policy objectives are not selfdefeating in the longer term.228
U.S. Abstention from the Conflict.
Initially ignoring the Balkan crisis, and leaving matters in
European and U.N. hands have not been helpful. While credit must
be given to European and U.N. attempts to resolve the crisis,
those efforts failed. Nor did intermittent U.S. attention to the
crisis until mid-1995 contribute to efforts to end the conflict.
Indeed, only clear, strong, and continuous U.S. leadership has
been able to coalesce NATO and bring Balkan belligerents to the
negotiating table. Thus, like it or not–either in Europe or in
the United States–American leadership remains central to a
prolonged settlement.
On a more general level, the United States observing the
Balkan crisis from the sidelines sends a disturbing signal to the
rest of the world. What does such a move say of U.S. credibility
in remaining engaged as a European power and NATO leader?
Moreover, could the United States expect allies, particularly
Muslim allies, to support the embargo of Iraq when the United
States is unwilling to underwrite similar action in the Balkans?
Allowing the violence to continue also sets a poor precedent for
other ongoing or potential ethnic conflicts in Europe.229 If the
United States wishes to minimize future occurrences of ethnic
violence around the globe, it must send an appropriate message of
engagement to end the worst case of ethnic conflict in Europe in
the past half century.
While some might argue that U.S. interests are not
sufficiently engaged to merit U.S. military intervention in the
conflict,230 the fact of the matter is that the United States is
already deeply engaged militarily in the ongoing crisis in the
Balkans. Since November 1992, U.S. naval vessels have taken part
in the maritime enforcement of the U.N. embargo of the
belligerents. U.S. Air Force transport aircraft have landed and
dropped tons of humanitarian aid to besieged enclaves. U.S. Air
Force and U.S. Navy aircraft participate daily in the enforcement
of the U.N. "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Hercegovina, have shot down
Bosnian Serb aircraft, and have been the principal participants
in NATO bombing missions supporting the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Hercegovina. American planes have been
fired on by Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft batteries and surface-toair missiles and one USAF F-16 has been shot down. The United
States has undertaken the vast majority of the sorties in the

substantial NATO bombing effort to remove Bosnian Serb heavy
weapons from the Sarajevo area, and to protect remaining "safe
havens." To the south, over 500 U.S. soldiers are in Macedonia to
deter expansion of the conflict.231
Whether a more creative and decisive application of U.S.
military power could have contributed to a satisfactory
conclusion to the war without causing more harm than good is
unknown and probably unknowable at this juncture. Before
undertaking full-fledged peace enforcement operations, the United
States and its allies would have had to be willing to exert the
level of military force necessary to impose peace on the region.
To date, they have not been so inclined, because the costs loomed
larger than the uncertain prospects of "success" (which itself
was hard to define). Should peace not be achieved, the questions
surrounding such a decision to impose a peace will remain. Is the
United States willing to involve itself in an asymmetric conflict
(i.e., the United States perceives such involvement to be of a
limited nature, while the current belligerents see themselves
engaged in a total war of survival), a circumstance which has
caused the United States much agony in the past?232 Will the
United States and its allies and partners be willing to fight
ethnic Serbian or ethnic Croatian militias, the Croatian or
Serbian armies, or Bosnian government forces? Are U.S. and
European publics willing to underwrite the levels of forces and
resources that might be required? Are they willing to sustain the
casualties that might result? For how long? Current indications
offer little evidence of the level of governmental or public
commitment that would likely be required.233
Avoiding the employment of ground forces in BosniaHercegovina, however, also is fraught with consequences. First,
the United States has elevated a means normally used to assist in
achieving a national objective to the status of a policy goal. In
doing so, the United States has stood the strategy formulation
process (i.e., the balancing of objectives, options, and
resources–also known as ends, ways, and means) on its head.234 In
effect, the United States has denied itself the use of a key
element of national power, and considerably circumscribed its
ability to influence resolution of the conflict through an
integrated and complementary application of national power.
Conversely, decisionmakers must address the possibility
that, even in support of a peace settlement it largely brokered,
the United States might be unable to sustain an internal
consensus for the prolonged deployment of U.S. forces in the
region. If that is the case, are policymakers prepared for the
potential consequences? Premature removal of U.S. troops from the
implementation force (IFOR) would undermine U.S. credibility
throughout the world, not just in the Balkans or Europe, as the
"demonstration effect" of failure might encourage other states
or groups to test U.S. resolve.235 Such an outcome would thereby
affect the credibility of the United Nations and NATO, two
institutions that loom large in the U.S. global security

architecture.236 Key allies within NATO might question the level
of U.S. commitment to Europe, with repercussions that extend to
U.S. interests elsewhere in the world (e.g., the Middle East).
Lastly, recriminations surrounding a U.S. withdrawal may add
impetus to the rising tide of "neo-isolationism" or unilateralism
in the United States that will further undermine U.S. support of
international institutions, which, one must emphasize, generally
serve U.S. interests.
Despite the risks and costs inherent in U.S. participation,
the United States must remain engaged in the Balkans. The course
of events in the former Yugoslavia clearly indicates that absent
strong U.S. leadership, the wars will continue without
resolution. Moreover, only U.S. leadership has been able to mold
the consensus within NATO and among U.S. European allies and
partners to make progress towards ending the wars. Likewise, only
the United States has sufficient military forces and staying
power to underwrite a prolonged supervision of the peace.
This conclusion does not imply that America's allies and
partners in Europe are absolved of responsibility. To the
contrary, they must continue to support–as they have for the past
4 years–the peace process. At the same time, the U.S. public and
government must recognize that Europeans have borne the brunt of
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, albeit unsuccessfully
thus far, and have already paid a high price in treasure and
lives.
Nor does this conclusion imply that the United States, in
assuming the leadership role, can simply shove aside its European
allies and partners. Leadership does not mean dominance or
unilateralism. The United States must ensure that its partners
remain fully integrated into the peace process and consultation
continues to occur. None of this will be easy, but close
cooperation will be an essential element for maintaining peace.
If not, the United States runs the risk of alienating its allies
and partners, or, worse still, being left holding the bag in the
Balkans.
Containment.
A wider war within the former Yugoslavia still holds
considerable potential to expand to a larger Balkan conflict.
Albania and Albanian minorities in Macedonia have close religious
ties to their coreligionists in Bosnia. Additionally, Turkey has
extensive ties to Albania and Macedonia, and has voiced strong
support for Bosnia.237 Should Turkey become embroiled in the war,
Greece would undoubtedly be drawn in, pitting two NATO allies on
opposite sides. Should conflict spread into Macedonia, Bulgaria
would also probably feel compelled to enter into the conflict.
Or, if war spread into the Vojvodina region with its substantial
Hungarian minorities, it could then expand into Central Europe.
In any of these cases, U.S. national interests in Europe would

be jeopardized.
To date, efforts to contain the conflict to Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina and prevent the spread of fighting have been
largely successful.238 How long that success can be sustained in
the face of renewed pressures from belligerents for a military
resolution of the crisis remains to be seen. While recent
Croatian and Bosnian successes may have redressed the balance
within the former Yugoslavia, that balance is tenuous and cannot
guarantee that the conflict can be contained within the borders
of the former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnia-Hercegovina.239
Bosnian and Croatian assaults against the ethnic Bosnian Serb
stronghold of Banja Luka could force Serbian President
Milosevic's hand and result in the intervention of the Yugoslav
Army, and a widening of the war.240 And, despite recent reverses,
ethnic Serb resistance is stiffening, and they remain capable of
launching a counterattack.241
Additionally, eastern Slavonia remains a bone of contention
between Croatia and Serbia, and Croatian authorities have
indicated that Croatia will go to war to retrieve the territory
if peace negotiations fail.242 This time, however, given the
increased firepower and capabilities of each side, the war could
be substantially bloodier, with the potential to spill over the
borders of the former Yugoslavia.
The possibility also exists that the fragile BosnianCroatian coalition could collapse, resulting in renewed war
between Bosnian forces and ethnic Croatian militias or the
Croatian Army. Depending upon the outcome of such a conflict, two
subsequent branches are possible: ethnic Serb militias and/or
Serbian Army forces fighting a greatly weakened Bosnian
government, or, more likely, Serbia and Croatia fighting over the
remains of Bosnia-Hercegovina.243
Lastly, given their recent successes against ethnic Serbs,
the Bosnian government may no longer find that the proposed 51-49
percent split contained in the U.S. initiative holds much
appeal.244 After 4 years of failed negotiations and recent
battlefield success, it may have concluded that much more is to
be gained through continuing the war than by ending it.245 And, so
long as the wars continue, the potential for the Yugoslav crisis
to escape its current bounds remains a clear possibility.
All that having been said, the policy of containment has
been successful on two key counts. It has kept the conflict from
spreading beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, and it is
avoided the commitment of substantial numbers of U.S. ground
troops in a combat role.246 But, as argued two-and-one-half years
ago, the cost of those "successes" has been extremely high,
particularly for the inhabitants of the Balkans.
Diplomatic and Economic Options.

Another option is to increase diplomatic and economic
pressure on Serbia and its Bosnian Serb allies. Should the
conflict extend into 1996, U.S. and European negotiators could
continue increasingly to isolate the Bosnian Serbs by inducing
Milosevic's cooperation in more strictly enforcing the existing
embargo in return for temporarily lifting economic sanctions
against Serbia. The Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany,
Russia, and the United States), however, have shown an inability
to agree on either the terms for the Serbian side of the deal or
on how long sanctions might be lifted.247 Even if consensus could
be achieved within the Contact Group, whether Milosevic could or
would deliver his part of the bargain after sanctions against
Serbia had been lifted is an open question. Nor is it apparent
that Belgrade could bring much more pressure to bear on the Pale
Serbs than is currently the case.
The United States and its allies and partners also could
strengthen the existing embargo of Serbia and Montenegro, and use
economic warfare to force Belgrade and Pale to change their
course. This would require adding to the commodities prohibited,
making the embargo more impermeable, and subsidizing states
(Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan states) negatively affected by
the increased sanctions.248 Given the split within the Contact
Group and the unlikelihood of economic subsidies, however, this
option offers little prospect of occurring.249
Nonetheless, if the United States and its allies continue to
eschew the application of decisive military power to end the
conflict, this may be the only option available that has a
significant chance for long-term success. For, despite continued
disappointment over the slow course of diplomatic and economic
efforts, the United States can look back on 3 years of gradual
success in weakening the Serbian economy and splitting the Serb
factions in Bosnia and Croatia from wholehearted Serbian
government support.
Lift the Arms Embargo of Bosnia.
Some observers have long advocated lifting the arms embargo
and providing the Bosnians with the means for effective
resistance.250 Two-plus years ago, the author considered such an
option wrongheaded because it would neither solve the underlying
political conflict nor bring the civil war to military
resolution–except, perhaps, after a forced U.N. withdrawal and
Bosnian defeat.251 As the recent and successful Croatian and
Bosnian government offensives have demonstrated, however, that
situation no longer holds. Indeed, the situation on the ground
appears to make lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia more
feasible from the standpoint of delivering materiel and providing
training support.
But lifting the arms embargo is still problematic. Such an

option is still more likely to lead to an escalation of fighting
than it is to a political settlement of the conflict. Moreover,
"leveling the playing field" to allow the Bosnian government to
defend the territory it currently holds does not secure its
authority over all of Bosnia. That goal, despite the boost given
to it by recent Bosnian and Croatian success in the Krajina
region and in central Bosnia, seems well out of reach of the
Bosnian government. Only substantial military aid, time to
receive, distribute, and train with it, and, most crucial,
Croatian support could produce such an outcome. And, while the
United States has raised the possibility of assisting in the
training of Bosnian government forces, this initiative generally
has received a chilly response from NATO allies.252 Whether the
aid or the time would be available without large-scale U.S.
intervention is doubtful.
Even absent significant U.S. participation in arming and
training Bosnian government forces, a number of other issues also
must be factored into the decisionmaking calculus.253 For
instance, how much aid should be allowed to flow to the Bosnian
government? This is not a calculation that can be made with a
high degree of certainty. Too little aid simply prolongs the war
by raising Bosnian expectations, but not necessarily providing
adequate capabilities to prevail. Too much assistance might cause
Bosnian government forces to overreach, precipitating a repeat of
the Krajina Serb exodus, intervention by the Yugoslav Army on
behalf of its ethnic Serbian brethren, or both. If the United
States and its NATO allies are not prepared to take steps to
forestall potential Serb actions (such as air strikes or the
deployment of ground forces), lifting the arms embargo will be
little more than, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Madeleine Albright, "a feel-good option."254
Alternatively, how much aid, if any, should go to the
already formidable Croatian Army? Too much aid risks a broader
war between Croatia and Serbia over eastern Slavonia. Or, the
Croats could turn on their nominal Bosnian allies to carve off
areas of Bosnia populated by ethnic Croatians.
Beyond the likely deadly results inside Bosnia and the
former Yugoslavia, lifting the arms embargo would have severe
repercussions throughout Europe. To date, the United States has
been unable to build consensus within NATO to lift the arms
embargo. Indeed, Britain and France, key European and NATO allies
who also have borne the largest portion of the UNPROFOR burden,
have threatened to remove their contingents in the event the
United States no longer complies with the arms embargo of
Bosnia.255 Undoubtedly, UNPROFOR would collapse, and the United
States would have to make good on its pledge to provide ground
forces to assist in UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Finally, Russia has
threatened to defy the trade sanctions regime against Serbia
should the United States unilaterally overturn the arms embargo
of Bosnia.256 Such an outcome would have obvious effects on U.S.Russian, as well as European-Russian relations.

Despite all the potential drawbacks, however, lifting the
arms embargo should remain an option. Should the Bosnian
government face defeat from ethnic Serb forces or from Croatian
forces (either ethnic Croat Bosnians or the Croatian Army), and
the United States and its allies and partners choose not to
intervene directly, lifting the embargo–even unilaterally–may be
the only choice, unless the United States is willing to see
Bosnia-Hercegovina defeated and dismembered. But, that choice
must be made with the full understanding of the ramifications for
U.S. policy and commitment to the region.
Partition and Mass Exchange of Populations.
The United States has pursued the objective of retaining the
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina and retaining a
multi-ethnic state that remains viable for all its peoples.257 In
the original version of this report, the author supported this
idealistic goal, arguing that the human costs of a population
exchange that would result from a partition would be staggering.
The author also argued at that time that an exchange of ethnic
populations would be viewed as little more than aiding and
abetting the ongoing "ethnic cleansing," and would set a bad
precedent for other ethnic groups in Europe to use as a pretext
for initiating conflict in hopes of obtaining a similar
solution.258
The events of the last 2 years have altered that judgement.
While still morally repugnant, the harsh realities of the
circumstances in the former Yugoslavia must prevail. Large-scale
population shifts–either through ethnic cleansing or mass refugee
movements fleeing combat operations–already have changed the
ethnic distribution of peoples throughout the former Yugoslavia.
Additionally, events of the past 4 years have polarized the
attitudes of large elements of the population, making the
likelihood of stable multi-ethnic communities difficult, at
best.259
That having been said, partition, de facto or de jure, is
not without its difficulties. Sizeable elements of ethnic groups
continue to reside in their historical homelands, and may be
loathe to leave. The prospect of forcing their displacement to
conform to a partition agreement is only slightly less daunting
than the prospect of large-scale return of refugees to their prewar homes. No one looks forward to forced displacement should an
individual, family, or group refuse to leave their homes. On the
other hand, if such groups remain, they may be the target of
future ethnic cleansing or the source of future conflict. Nor
does partition necessarily lead to peace, as displaced groups are
likely to harbor irredentist hopes to return to their ancestral
homes. Finally, should partition and further exchange of peoples
occur, how can victims be compensated?

Participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) Operations.260
The United States has committed to assist in implementing a
peace settlement in Bosnia- Hercegovina.261 The logic behind such
a significant U.S. commitment merits brief discussion. First, the
three warring parties each stipulate that they will not sign an
agreement unless U.S. troops are part of the implementation
force. Thus, failure to support a peace settlement will
undoubtedly lead to a collapse of the current cease-fire, with
consequent repercussions. Large-scale military operations would
likely resume, with a concomitant increase in "ethnic cleansing."
Renewed fighting increases the likelihood that Serbia would be
drawn into the conflict, increasing casualties and suffering,
and raising the potential for war to spread beyond the borders of
the former Yugoslavia. Second, a breakdown in the current ceasefire also would undoubtedly lead to an UNPROFOR withdrawal, which
the United States has pledged to assist. Thus, U.S. forces would
be committed to the region in any case, and probably under much
more difficult and dangerous conditions than implementing a peace
settlement. Lastly, U.S. leadership and prestige–in Europe and
world-wide–would suffer a tremendous blow.262 U.S. participation
in implementing an agreement, therefore, may be the sine qua non
for a peace settlement and sustainment of U.S. national interests
in the region.
The possibility that a peace agreement may be reached looms
large on the horizon. As a consequence, the United States must
now seriously consider the implications of its commitment.
American participation in the peace implementation effort is
premised on three key assumptions:
• All sides in the ongoing conflict will sign an agreement;
• All sides will implement the agreement; and,
• Fighting will not resume at a level that peace
implementation forces would have to be withdrawn for their own
safety.
None of these assumptions should be taken for granted, and
planning for U.S. participation should include measures that will
protect its forces in the event one or more of the assumptions do
not hold.
The composition of the U.S. contribution, for example,
deserves reflection. Policymakers understand that air power,
alone, is not sufficient to implement an agreement, and the
United States has previously committed to deploy up to 25,000
troops. But, notwithstanding that 2-plus-year commitment,
considerable pulling and tugging is being waged in Washington
over the eventual size of the peace implementation force. Size
options vary from little or no U.S. ground troops, as currently
being advocated by elements within Congress, to 8-10,000

personnel being espoused by elements of the Clinton
administration, to the Pentagon's recommendation to deploy a
powerful force (20-25,000) capable of responding to any
contingency.263
In assessing the level of contribution that the United
States is willing to make, several points need to be considered.
First, despite any peace agreement, U.S. forces will be entering
a tense and volatile environment. Indeed, for 3-plus years
Bosnia-Hercegovina has been a killing ground that has generated
intense emotions. To expect those passions to dissipate rapidly
is to expect too much. Moreover, a NATO force can be expected to
oversee implementing provisions of the peace settlement. U.S.
forces, therefore, initially must be configured, armed, and sized
to engage in possible combat operations. Over time, and as
conditions permit, force composition and size can evolve to fit
the changing circumstances–but initially forces must be capable
of defending themselves and enforcing a peace settlement on any
recalcitrant parties.
Second, national influence within most coalitions usually is
proportional to the level of participation and the degree of risk
assumed. Projections of NATO force requirements approach 50,00060,000 troops.264 While the United States may not be required to
provide a majority of the forces, a plurality among the
participating countries may be necessary to assert leadership
over the operation. In short, the United States will have to pay
the piper if it wants to call the tune. Whether a troop level at
the lower end of the range currently being debated in Washington
(0-10,000) will be sufficient to ensure U.S. leadership of the
overall operation is open to question.265 This is especially true
if U.S. troop levels approximate those of France, which has borne
the heaviest peacekeeping role–as well as casualties–in the
former Yugoslavia. Nor is U.S. leadership guaranteed if Russia
contributes upwards of 20,000 troops, as Moscow recently
indicated.266
Third, conditions in Yugoslavia will not be resolved quickly
and a long-term commitment of forces will likely be required.267 A
prolonged deployment would necessitate provisions for rotating
units through the peace implementation mission. To accomplish
this over the long term, forces initially deployed must be sized
and "tailored" to accommodate such rotations. Additionally,
because of the reduction of forces in Europe, units from the
continental United States might be required. This may be
especially true of specialized combat support and combat service
support units (such as port handling, transportation). Moreover,
the numbers of such specialized units are limited in the Active
Component, and provisions may have to be made to ensure
appropriate augmentation from the Reserve Components.268
Imposing a Peace Settlement.269

Despite the recent success of peace efforts, negotiations
could easily fall apart, and large scale conflict could resume.270
Such an outcome might induce the United States and its allies and
partners to impose a settlement on (a) reluctant belligerent(s)
in order to contain the conflict. In fact, in announcing its
latest peace initiative, the Clinton administration indicated
that if peace could not be achieved, then additional "sticks"
would be applied to get the recalcitrant parties to negotiate in
earnest. These "sticks" could include replacing UNPROFOR
peacekeepers with troops from Islamic states, or lifting the arms
embargo, which would undoubtedly trigger a NATO protected
UNPROFOR withdrawal that the United States has pledged to support
with up to 25,000 ground troops.271
U.S. policymakers must understand that in imposing a peace
settlement, they must be prepared to take action against any and
all sides who refuse to enter into an agreement. While the United
States repeatedly has professed its neutrality, or at least that
it is not anti-Serb, that perception is not shared by Bosnian
Serbs. Indeed, ethnic Serbs are likely to resent U.S.
intervention, which they perceive to be the reason for their
latest reversals. Certainly, Bosnian Serbs are likely to harbor
ill will against the United States because of its lead in the
NATO bombing effort. U.S. forces, therefore, must be prepared to
undertake operations against Bosnian Serbs who might obstruct the
peace agreement. Operations might also have to be conducted
against Croatian units–both regular Croatian Army troops and
ethnic Croatian irregulars–who currently occupy Bosnian
territory, but refuse to leave.272 Finally, the United States and
its allies and partners may have to undertake operations against
Bosnian government forces that refuse to enter into negotiations
or fail to abide by the provisions of an eventual peace
agreement.273
Potential means to impose a peace also require some
forethought. Use of air power appears to offer the safest, most
effective means to impose the peace, especially in the wake of
the apparent success of forcing the Bosnian Serbs to remove their
weapons from the heavy weapons exclusion zone surrounding
Sarajevo. But appearances may belie reality. In the recent NATO
bombing campaign (August-September 1995), for example, many of
the targets struck were air defense sites or fixed installations,
while the heavy weapons were not attacked. Tanks and artillery
pieces make good targets only if they can be detected and
attacked before they disperse. The mountainous terrain,
considerable foliage, weather conditions, and proximity to
civilian habitation in Yugoslavia combined to hinder air attacks
on mobile targets. Moreover, according to media reports, NATO had
eliminated the more "lucrative" targets and was running out of
feasible points to attack.274
Additionally, media reports noted that tensions within NATO
were rising over the duration and scope of NATO air attacks.275
These strains raise a host of questions on the use of air power

to drive belligerent(s) to the negotiating table that require
resolution. What level of force should be applied? What should be
targeted: ethnic irregular forces or the regular forces of the
combatants; tanks, artillery, or units; supply lines, depots, and
airfields; government centers (if appropriate ones can be
identified276) and command and control facilities; or power grids,
fuel supplies, and other dual civil-miliary use resources? What
should be the priority? Answers to these questions, as well as
potential second and third order consequences, must be considered
before the further commitment of U.S. aircraft in support of NATO
efforts.
Lastly, when considering the use of air power as a means to
impose a peace settlement, policymakers must take into account
its key limitation. Air power, even if sufficient to bring
reluctant belligerents to the negotiations table, is a woefully
inappropriate instrument to compel compliance with the myriad
technical details of an agreement.
The possibility also exists that air power, alone, would
prove insufficient to bring a reluctant belligerent(s) to
negotiate in earnest. What further steps, then, would the United
States and its allies be willing to take? The United States may
be faced with two equally unpalatable options. On the one hand,
the United States could simply wash its hands, and walk away from
the conflict. For obvious reasons (U.S. prestige involved,
influence in Europe, global U.S. leadership), such an option is
not to be taken lightly.
On the other hand, the United States, in conjunction with
its allies and partners, could undertake ground operations to
impose a peace. Obviously, exercising the "ground" option raises
a number of key questions:
• Will the United States and its allies and partners
undertake military operations against Croatia, should that state
refuse to accede to a peace settlement?
• Will the United States, NATO, and partners undertake
operations against Bosnian government forces should the Bosnian
government attempt to recover additional territory, or restore
the territorial status quo ante bellum?
• What additional actions should be taken against Bosnian
Serbs if they refuse to accept a peace settlement? Concomitantly,
should actions be directed only against Bosnian Serbs, what are
the likely reactions from Serbia and Russia?
• What actions, if any, should be taken against Serbia
proper if ethnic Bosnian Serbs refuse to comply with a peace
settlement?
• In a worst case scenario, how might the United States and
its allies and partners respond to a renewed outbreak of general

hostilities despite their presence?
• How should Russian forces be incorporated into a peace
enforcement effort?
Answers to these questions are complicated and cannot be
answered here with any certainty, but some generalizations may be
appropriate. While NATO and partner forces would likely prevail
tactically in imposing a peace, the price could be considerable.
Given the terrain, ethnic Croatian and Serbian irregular forces
available, and Serbian and, particularly, Croatian regular
formations, ground operations would not resemble the U.S.
experience in Panama or Somalia. Nor would operations be similar
to Operation DESERT STORM, where a clearly delineated battlefield
and open terrain allowed the allied coalition to bring
overwhelming military power to bear rapidly to defeat the enemy.
Even should operations initially succeed, allied forces
could remain within a sea of hostile populations. Given the
distant and recent history of the region, irregular operations,
guerrilla warfare, and terrorism should not be ruled out. This is
not an attempt to conjure up ghosts of the past (either the U.S.
experience in Vietnam or the Yugoslav Partisan experience during
World War II), but if the U.S. commitment lasts too long, or if
U.S. casualties mount, the Vietnam, Beirut, and Mogadishu
analogies are certain to surface.277
Even if casualties are low, financial expenditures would be
considerable. Current estimates for U.S. participation in peace
implementation operations–a much less expensive undertaking than
imposing a peace settlement–range from $1 billion to $2
billion.278 Estimates for such complex operations appear low. For
example, the final costs of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia
were $1.51 billion.279 Certainly, operations in Yugoslavia that
would be on a much larger scale and would be carried out against
a well-armed and organized opponent(s) would be much higher, and
could prove to be a considerable drain on a reduced defense
budget.
Neither potential casualties nor resource costs that might
be associated with U.S. participation in imposing a peace
settlement can be forecast with any accuracy, largely because the
extent of a possible U.S. commitment is not known. But, none of
the options and alternatives outlined above comes without cost.
The key question is: How much is the United States willing to pay
in terms of political capital, national treasure, and, most
importantly, in the lives of its young men and women?
Finally, even if operations are an overwhelming success, how
long will the United States and its allies be willing to maintain
forces in Bosnia to keep the resultant peace? As the aftermath of
the Gulf War indicates, the U.S.-led coalition is still ensnared
by events in the region, and no end of a substantial commitment
is in sight.280 Given the history of the Balkans, especially

recently, not much time might elapse between the departure of
outside intervention forces and renewed hostilities. To preclude
a return to war and the threat to U.S. interests posed by such
conflict may require a prolonged U.S. presence in the Balkans.
Policymakers need to examine these issues, and their
potential consequences, before they undertake additional
operations. If they are unwilling to pursue any of the options
outlined above, then they should not start down the path of
intervention, or, at least, not before they understand the fuller
consequences of their actions. If, after consideration, they
determine that potential costs are acceptable, then they must
articulate their rationale to the American public and their
elected representatives and build the consensus that will be
necessary to sustain a prolonged U.S. involvement in the Balkans.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The statesman must cross the Rubicon not knowing how
deep and turbulent the river is, nor what he will find
on the other side . . . He must face the impenetrable
darkness of the future and not flinch from walking into
it, drawing the nation behind him.
–Hans J. Morganthau281
Pressures are building for a stronger U.S. military
intervention in the former Yugoslavia, to include the
introduction of ground troops. Before such steps are taken,
policymakers must recognize several key points. First, whether we
admit it or not, the United States is already involved. Second,
there are no easy answers to the many Balkan conundra and
potential long-term solutions could be painful. Third, all
alternatives have consequences: some intended, others unintended.
Decisionmakers must be fully cognizant of the former and identify
as many as possible of the latter. Fourth, all short-term options
are flawed: each has drawbacks, costs, and risks that must be
weighed against the potential gains. Fifth, there is no agreedupon script on how these options will play out. Policymakers,
therefore, must understand the second and third order
consequences of their decisions and must be prepared to implement
alternatives. Finally, the American public must be made aware of
the U.S. interests involved, and the risks inherent in increased
U.S. intervention in the conflict.
To assess the potential consequences of U.S. involvement,
policymakers and the public can first turn to the general
criteria for the employment of U.S. forces laid out in A National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:
• Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a
reasonable chance of success?
• Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
• What is the environment of risk we are entering?
• What is needed to achieve our goals?
• What are the potential costs–human and financial –of the
engagement?
• Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the
American people and their elected representatives?
• Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of
success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit
strategy?282

Not included within the criteria spelled out in A National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement are a number of
additional questions that merit reflection.
• What are the specific political objectives to be achieved
in Bosnia-Hercegovina? What is the desired end state of the
conflict? How do these objectives contribute to U.S. objectives
for the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, as a whole? How will
they affect U.S. relations with European allies and partners?
What are the potential effects on U.S.-Russian relations?
• Will the employment of military power help achieve
national objectives?
• What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to
achieve political objectives?
• Will allies or partners join, or at least endorse, the
U.S. resort to military force?
• How long and to what extent is the United States willing
to commit forces to the region?
The reasons for asking these questions deserve repeating. If
policymakers do not clearly understand their goals and the
possible directions their decisions may take them, the United
States runs the risk of its policy being controlled by, rather
than controlling, events. As former Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara noted in his recent book, In Retrospect: The Tragedy
and Lessons of Vietnam, the failure to ask the difficult
questions about policy, questions the answers to which were bound
to be unsettling, allowed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
to make decisions based on addressing short-term crises. "Over
and over again . . . we failed to address the fundamental issues;
our failure to identify them was not recognized; and deep-seated
disagreements among the president's advisers about how to proceed
were neither surfaced nor resolved."283 Thus, if not careful, the
United States could be incrementally drawn into the miasma of the
Balkans with no clear idea of how it got there or how it can get
out.
Answering such difficult questions, particularly given the
number of weighty issues, is not an easy task. And, a
comprehensive answer to each question is beyond the constraints
of this monograph. Nonetheless, the issue of U.S. national
interests in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans deserves some
attention. The United States has a vital interest in ensuring a
peaceful and stable Europe, and the ongoing wars in the former
Yugoslavia represent a significant threat to that goal.
Should the fighting spill over the borders of the former
Yugoslavia, the stability and security of the entire Balkan
peninsula may be at risk. This disequilibrium could set back the

development of newly emerging market-based democracies in the
region that have struggled successfully, to date, to change their
national and international behavior. An expanded war also would
likely involve Greece and Turkey–two key U.S. and NATO allies–
probably on opposite sides. The ramifications for Balkan security
and NATO would be significant.
Instability in the Balkans naturally influences security
within the remainder of Europe. Most immediately, a massive
exchange of populations could generate a wave of refugees that
destabilizes the region. Of greater importance, perhaps,
prolonged strife in the Balkans could strain relations between
Western Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States
and Russia. This could lead to a nationalization of security
agendas throughout Eastern Europe, which would have cascading
effects for security agendas in Central and Western Europe, as
well.
Continued war in the Balkans also holds significant
potential to increase strains within NATO. Differences with key
NATO allies over the course of policy regarding Bosnia already
have placed a heavy strain on relations within the Alliance.
These tensions could be exacerbated by continued stagnation of
the peace process, escalation of the fighting to include Greece
and Turkey, or the withdrawal of British, French, or other NATO
forces from UNPROFOR.
Ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia is also likely to
diminish support within the United States for substantial U.S.
engagement in international affairs. The apparent ineffectiveness
of the United Nations, and the intramural squabbling within NATO
could undermine U.S. public support for both of those key
security organizations; thereby undercutting the larger role
anticipated for these institutions in supporting and promoting
U.S. security interests.
The inability of the United States to shape a resolution of
the war in the former Yugoslavia is likely to have additional
indirect consequences for U.S. global security interests. Should
nations question the depth of U.S. commitment to security and
stability or its willingness to confront aggression, U.S.
influence might be undermined in key areas of the world. At the
same time, potential opponents might perceive that they could
challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty.
At the very least, subnational and transnational groups may draw
the lesson that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their
agendas in this new security order. If combined, these phenomena
could have a "snowball" effect that contributes to a downward
spiral of U.S. influence abroad. Eventually, the United States
might find its deterrent capability sufficiently eroded that an
adversary might directly confront major U.S. interests.
Normally, the United States would rely on European states or
security bodies to address a crisis such as the Balkans, but few,

if any, states or multinational organizations are prepared to
cope with this conflict. Nor does it appear that a European
coalition, much less individual states, have the capacity or the
will for decisive political, economic, or military action to
settle a war in what has been perceived as a distant land. As a
result, national interests compel the United States to take a
leading role in resolving the violence in the former Yugoslavia.
As the preceding analysis indicates, however, there are no
easy alternatives for U.S. policymakers to pursue in their
efforts to resolve the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia. Each
has its pluses and minuses; each is fraught with risk. But, while
the war is complex, confusing, and appears intractable, the
United States should not be deterred from seeking potential
solutions. In fact, the severity of potential consequences should
drive U.S. policymakers to take an even more active role in
conflict resolution efforts, for much more is at stake than
simply the fighting in Bosnia.
In pursuing policy options for the ongoing conflict in the
Balkans:
• The first priority for policymakers must remain ensuring
that the war does not spread beyond its current confines.
• The second priority is to sustain a viable, cohesive, and
effective North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
• The third priority is to cap the violence, as the United
States is currently attempting to do, and provide a basis for a
more lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia–and, by extension the
Balkans.
While arguably a harsh choice, this priority represents
strategic reality. This conclusion, however, does not argue that
policymakers should assess options only from the cold detachment
of harsh strategic realities. The leadership role of the United
States has been built not only on its political, economic, and
military power, but on American values. As pressures build for
the United States to exercise its leadership role, American
policymakers will have to factor this critical imperative into
their strategic decision-making calculus.
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